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In 1999, twelve-year-old Lionel Tate was arrested and charged with kill-
ing his six-year-old playmate, Tiffany Eunick. Lionel's case remained at the
center of international attention well after December 2003, when the Fourth
District Court of Appeal for the State of Florida questioned Lionel's compe-
tence to stand trial and reversed Lionel's adult murder conviction and life sen-
tence.' Lionel's case was noteworthy for a number of reasons: the
extraordinary youth of the offender; the tragic violence that led to the six-year-
old's death; questions about Lionel's competence; and the ultimate conviction
and sentencing of a twelve-year-old, in adult court, to life in adult prison.
However, most noteworthy for the present discussion was the extraordinary
role Lionel's mother, Florida Highway Patrol Trooper Kathleen Grossett-Tate,
played throughout the case. By virtually all accounts, Lionel relied heavily, if
not entirely, on the guidance and direction of his mother at all critical junctures
in the proceedings.2 Most significantly, Lionel's mother was one of the pri-
mary driving forces behind Lionel's decision to reject a plea offer that would
have removed the possibility of a life-sentence in adult court and guaranteed
Lionel a three-year placement in a juvenile facility followed by ten years of
probation.3 As Ms. Gossett-Tate stubbornly told the court before trial, "People
say I am a fool not to accept the plea from the state, but how do you accept a
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Deputy Director,
Juvenile Justice Clinic. J.D., Yale Law School, 1995; L.L.M., Georgetown Law Center,
2002; A.B., Duke University, 1992. 1 thank Paul Holland, Annette Appell, and members of
the Junior Faculty Research Workshop at Georgetown for their comments and feedback on
drafts of this article. I also thank Kathleen Pirozzolo for her invaluable research assistance.
I Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); see also Noah Bierman, Appeal
Court Grants Lionel Tate a New Trial, THE MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 11, 2003, at IA (noting
that Lionel's mother was granted audience with Pope John Paul II in 2003).
2 Interview with Richard Rosenbaum, appellate attorney for Lionel Tate, (May 11, 2004)
(Interview on file with author). Rosenbaum reports that Lionel was especially reliant on his
mother in making decisions about his case. See also Michael Browning et al., Boy, 14, Gets
Life in TV Wrestling Death: Killing of 6-yr-old Playmate Wasn't Just Horseplay, Florida
Judge Says, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at 1; Teen Serving Life Jubilant over Retrial,
Dec. 11, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/12/1l/wrestling.death/index.html (last vis-
ited August 5, 2005); see also Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48-49 (discussing evidence that Tate
simply followed his mother's instructions regarding key decisions in the case).
I Browning, supra note 2, at 1.
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plea for second-degree murder when your child was just playing?"' Lionel's
mother, and subsequently his trial lawyer, were criticized throughout the legal
community for allowing Lionel to reject the plea offer.5
For those of us who represent children and adolescents in juvenile and
criminal courts, the scenario above is familiar. Whether we represent the child
against charges of petty theft or homicide, parents often remain integrally
involved-for better or worse-in many of the child's case-related decisions.
Even where the child's competence is not at issue, the child will often look to
parents for guidance in navigating the juvenile and criminal justice systems.
How should Lionel's lawyer have responded to Ms. Grossett-Tate's insistence
on trial? To what extent should any child's lawyer encourage or discourage the
child from consulting with parents or other relatives on whom the child clearly
depends? To what extent can and should the lawyer advise the parent? What
should the lawyer do when the child insists upon following his mother's advice
contrary to the lawyer's best efforts to persuade him otherwise? To complicate
the circumstances, what if Tiffany Eunick's mother sued or threatened to sue
Lionel's mother for gross negligence in the supervision of her son? What if
prosecutors sought to charge Ms. Grosssett-Tate for criminal negligence or
contributing to the delinquency of a minor? How would the risk of civil or
criminal liability affect the quality and reliability of the parent's advice or
impact the attorney-parent interaction? Unfortunately, these questions arise
with frequency but rarely lend themselves to easy answers.
Legal scholars and practitioners have devoted considerable attention to
defining the role of the child's lawyer. Scholars have argued about whether
lawyers should advocate for the best interests or the expressed interests of the
child and have grappled with the allocation of decision-making authority
between the child and the lawyer. Scholars have also debated the appropriate
role of parents in the attorney-client dyad. In 1996, a group of scholars con-
vened at Fordham Law School to address many of these questions. At the
conclusion of the conference, participants issued a series of recommendations
clearly recognizing the child's right to independent legal counsel and endorsing
a traditional, client-directed model of advocacy on behalf of children in all
types of legal proceedings.6 Today, most scholars have interpreted the child's
constitutional right to counsel in delinquency cases to mean that children, not
their parents, have the right to make key decisions regarding the course of their
legal representation.7
4 Id.
' Bierman, supra, note 1; Les Kjos, Analysis: Ruling Heartens Child Advocates, UNITED
PRESS INT'L, D.C., Dec. 11, 2003.
6 Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Chil-
dren, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1302 (1996).
' For a representative sampling, see Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and
Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 1083, 1129-30 (1991); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but not
Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 86-88
(1984); Kristin N. Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory
and the Role of Child's Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (2005);
Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A not so Radical View of Holistic
Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 334 (2003); Wallace J.
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Notwithstanding the pervasive endorsement of client-directed advocacy
for children at the Fordham Conference and elsewhere, Lionel Tate's case sug-
gests that traditional, client-directed advocacy often proves to be more difficult
in practice than in theory and exposes the great challenges that lawyers, chil-
dren, and parents face when children need legal advice. Children must choose
between the advice of parents they have known and trusted all of their lives and
the advice of an attorney whom they met for the first time in a moment of
crisis. Parents must decide if, and to what extent, they will intervene and
attempt to influence the direction of the child's case. Further, lawyers must
honor the child's constitutional right to loyal, independent counsel and help the
child make the best legal decisions without unduly disrupting important rela-
tionships within the family. Recognizing the importance of parents and other
family members in the lives of children, child advocates and scholars recon-
vened in 2006 for the UNLV Conference to examine the roles and responsibili-
ties of lawyers representing children in the context of family. Participants will
consider whether Fordham Recommendations have shifted the pendulum too
far in favor of children's rights and consider, among other questions: whether
the client-directed, individual rights model of advocacy unduly ignores the
child's position within the family; whether the potential exclusion of parents
from the attorney-child dyad may unintentionally compromise the legal and
other interests of the child; and whether children actually desire that parents be
excluded from the attorney-client relationship.
This Article considers whether, and to what extent, children do or should
look to parents for guidance in matters of juvenile delinquency.8 To this end, I
draw insight from theories of adolescent development, rules of professional
ethics, and principles of constitutional law and justice. In Part I, I identify
opportunities for support and collaboration between children and parents in the
juvenile justice system and then consider the potential for conflict in these fam-
ilies. In Part II, I propose six strategies for effective lawyering on behalf of
children and parents in juvenile court. Given the complexities of the issues, I
recognize that a single paradigm will not satisfy every attorney-child-parent
relationship. Instead, it is my hope to identify core principles that will guide
lawyers in counseling children, interacting with parents, and protecting the
Mylniec, Who Decides: Decision Making in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, in ETHICAL
PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER 119 (Rodney J. Uphoff ed., 1995); Rob-
ert E. Shepherd & Sharon S. England, I Know the Child is My Client, But Who Am 1?, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1917, 1942 (1996); Melinda G. Schmidt et al., Effectiveness of Participa-
tion as a Defendant: The Attorney-Juvenile Client Relationship, 21 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 175,
176 (2003).
8 For ease of discussion, I use the word "parent" throughout this article. However, given the
ever-evolving definition of "family," a more expansive view of "parent" would likely
include guardians, grandparents, or other caretakers in the child's extended family. I also
use the words "child" and "children" to convey the general idea of children as offspring of
their parents. Unless specifically stated, I do not intend to draw the more narrow contrast
between children, under the age of thirteen, and adolescents, aged thirteen to seventeen. In
fact, as I assert later in the article, evidence suggests that most youth who enter the juvenile
justice system enter during the adolescent years. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
The issues raised and recommendations offered throughout this Article should apply to chil-
dren of all ages and vary only according to the cognitive capacity of the child. See discus-
sion infra, Part II.F.
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legal rights of children charged with crime. In Part III, I propose a few sys-
temic reforms that might alleviate conflict and thereby facilitate a more effec-
tive relationship between the attorney, the child, and the parent.
I. CONTINUITY AND CONFLICT IN THE PARENT-ADOLESCENT DYAD
The juvenile justice system is a rich context in which to explore the inter-
section of the individual rights of children and the rights and interests of their
parents. While children in the juvenile justice system clearly need the support
and guidance of parents, the risk of conflict between children and parents in the
system is great. Parental involvement is generally indispensable in the rehabili-
tative mission of the court and is often essential in helping children communi-
cate with lawyers, make critical legal decisions, and achieve stated objectives
in the juvenile case. Parental support may also carry significant psychological
or therapeutic benefits for an accused child. Unfortunately, not all parental
intervention will advance the interests of the child. Because parents themselves
may be held formally accountable in juvenile, civil, or criminal courts for the
misconduct of their children, there is considerable risk of conflict between the
legal interests of the child and those of the parent. When the interests of chil-
dren and parents conflict and children remain dependent on and subordinate to
parents, the rights of children may be repressed. Even where there are no com-
peting legal interests, parents often do not fully understand or appreciate the
rights and risks at stake in the juvenile case and generally experience considera-
ble tension in deciding how best to help the child. Unlike the lawyer whose
role is fairly resolved in favor of the expressed interests of the child,9 parents
may be forced to choose between protecting their own legal interests and secur-
ing the best interests of the child.
Obvious and latent tensions in the parent-child relationship ultimately cre-
ate complex issues for the child, the parents, and the child's lawyer in a delin-
quency case. In section A of this Part, I consider the convergence of interests
in the parent-child relationship and explore ways in which the parent may be an
ally for the child in the exercise of important constitutional rights in a juvenile
case. In section B, I recognize the limits of parental allegiance to the child in
the delinquency context. Specifically, I explore areas of psychological and
legal conflict in the parent-child dyad and evaluate impediments to effective
communication and collaboration among attorneys, children, and their parents.
A. Parent as Ally: Continuity in the Parent-Adolescent Dyad
Although adolescence is marked by the child's quest for independence
from parents, the child remains dependent on parents not only for physical and
financial support, but also for moral support and guidance in times of crisis and
decision. When the interests of parents and children do not conflict, parents
may serve as a buffer against the coercive elements of the juvenile justice sys-
tem, help the child identify, secure, and communicate with counsel, and guide
the child in critical decisions regarding plea, trial, and disposition. Evidence
also suggests that healthy communication and collaboration between children
' See supra note 7.
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and their parents is important for the rehabilitation of delinquent children and
the stability of the entire family.
In this section, I look, first, at ways in which youth depend on parents
even as they approach the final stages of adolescence. Second, I examine nor-
mative preferences for open, healthy attachment and communication between
parents and children. And third, I consider the ways in which parents may help
children exercise their constitutional rights in the juvenile justice system.
1. Adolescent Dependence
Children in the juvenile justice system are neither fully independent, nor
completely dependent thinkers and actors. Although youth are entering juve-
nile courts at younger and younger ages,10 most enter the system as adoles-
cents, ranging from thirteen to seventeen years old." As youth move from
childhood to adolescence, the parent-child dyad and other relationships within
the family evolve."2 The parent-child relationship moves from one of unilateral
parental control and supervision in childhood to one of co-regulation or cooper-
ative negotiation of behavior in adolescence.1 3 Adolescents begin to share in
the decision-making process at home and exercise an increasing amount of
autonomy over their own behavior.' 4 The adolescent eventually begins to view
himself as psychologically separate from his parents'" and develops his own
identity, philosophies, and values as he spends less time at home and more time
with friends.' 6 When adolescents develop views about life that are inconsistent
with those of their parents, they may turn to peers, who are more likely to share
their views and perspectives, as a source of advice and support.' 7
10 See, e.g., Will Cruz & Karen Freifeld, Deadly Child's Play: Police Say Girl, 9, Stabbed
her friend, 11 with Steak Knife During Dispute over a Spaldeen Ball, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May
31, 2005; First-Grader Accused in Fatal School Shooting; Michigan Boy in Custody over
Classmate's Death, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 29, 2000, at 1; Police Cuff Girl, 5, for School Tantrum,
WINNIPEG SUN, Mar. 20, 2005, at A2.
II Scott W. Henggeler & Ashli J. Sheidow, Conduct Disorder and Delinquency, 29 J. OF
MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 505, 506 (2003) (majority of individuals who engage in violence
do not do so until adolescence, with sixteen years as average age of first serious offense);
Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 593-95
(2000-2001) (delinquency is rare in early adolescence, increases through age sixteen and
then decreases beginning at age seventeen).
12 Barbara N. Allison & Jerelyn B. Schultz, Parent-Adolescent Conflict in Early Adoles-
cence, Vol. 39 ADOLESCENCE, No. 153, at 101 (2004); Laurence Steinberg, Autonomy, Con-
flict and Harmony in the Family Relationship, in AT THE THRESHOLD: THE DEVELOPING
ADOLESCENT 255 (1990).
13 Elizabeth G. Menaghan, On the Brink: Stability and Change in Parent-Child Relations in
Adolescence, in CHILDREN'S INFLUENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS: THE NEGLECTED SIDE OF
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 154 (2003); Steinberg, supra note 12, at 265.
14 Allison & Schultz, supra note 12, at 101.
15 Steinberg, supra note 12, at 257.
16 RALPH GEMELLI, M.D., NORMAL CHILD AND ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 447 (1996);
Barry J. Fallon & Terry V.P. Bowles, Family Functioning and Adolescent Help-Seeking
Behavior, Vol. 50 FAM. REL., No. 3, at 240 (2001) (noting that the more time adolescents
spend with peers as opposed to parents, the more opportunity they have to seek guidance and
help from those peers); Steinberg, supra note 12, at 257-58.
17 GEMELLI, supra note 16, at 447.
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Although some conflict is normal and expected as relationships shift
within the family,' 8 it is important not to overstate the level of tension between
parents and adolescents. Modem theories of adolescent development reject the
orthodox view that interfamilial storm and rebellion will pervade the adolescent
years.1 9 Neoanalytic theorists argue that although adolescence does involve a
major realignment of roles within the family, adolescence does not always
require emotional detachment or distancing. 20 Even as adolescents move
toward independence, continuity and connection with family members remains
important. 21 The adolescent generally remains in the custody of a parent or
guardian, continues to look to adults for basic physical, emotional, and devel-
opmental needs, and does not develop a fully emancipated identity until the end
of adolescence at age eighteen or nineteen.22 As one professor of psychiatry
noted, "the adolescent is not an island unto himself.' '23 The adolescent regu-
larly seeks guidance, acceptance, and approval from parents, teachers, coaches,
religious leaders, and other significant adults.24 Even when adolescents disa-
gree with their parents, they often seek approval by attempting to justify their
views.25 Given the continued reliance of youth on their parents, lawyers should
expect that parents will retain considerable influence over the values, perspec-
tives, and even legal interests of youth through late adolescence.
2. Normative Preferences and Family-Focused Juvenile Justice
Systems
Empirical studies support a normative preference for open and healthy
communication between parents and children. 26 Open communication and dis-
cipline are the means by which parents transmit ideas about morality, instill
positive family values, and discourage anti-social behavior by children.2 7
Youth develop their own standards of decency by internalizing advice and gui-
18 Allison & Schultz, supra note 12, at 101.
19 Steinberg, supra note 12, at 257-58 (but recognizing that vast majority of studies on the
parent-adolescent relationship have been conducted with white, middle-class families).
20 Id.
21 Margheita Lanz, From Adolescence to Young Adulthood: A Family Transition, in THE
CHANGING FAMILY AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 132-133 (2000).
22 GEMELLI, supra note 16, at 467.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Lanz, supra note 21, at 134.
26 Healthy relationships generally involve verbal give and take between the parent and the
child, parental respect for the child's decisions, and the use of reason instead of judgment
and condemnation to obtain compliance. See Andrea Dawn Dickerson & Sedahlia Jasper
Crase, Parent-Adolescent Relationships: The Influence of Multi-Family Therapy Group on
Communication and Closeness, 33 AM. J. OF FAM. THERAPY 45, 46 (2005) (arguing that
adolescents are more likely to respect parents' morals when parents send message they care
about the child and respect the child's opinions and feelings); Steinberg, supra note 12, at
271 (arguing that adolescent identity development and interpersonal skills are better in fami-
lies in which there is frequent discourse with problem solving, empathy, and acceptance and
relatively little interchange that is devaluing, judgmental or constraining).
27 Dickerson & Crase, supra note 26, at 46; Lanz, supra note 21, at 134; Laura M. Padilla-
Walker & Gustavo Carlo, "It's not Fair!" Adolescents' Constructions of Appropriateness of
Parental Reactions, 33 J. OF YoUrH & ADOLESCENTS 389-401 (2004); see also Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977).
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dance provided over time by parents. Teenagers who report feeling close to
parents tend to be more responsible and have better school performance,
healthy self-esteem, and positive psychological development.2 8 These adoles-
cents are also less likely than others to engage in delinquency, possibly out of
29fear of parental disapproval and rejection.
Adolescents in well-adjusted families also view parents as disciplinarians,
moral advisors,3 ° role models, and confidantes. Many teens report admiration,
love, and appreciation by and for their parents and indicate a willingness to turn
to parents for advice. 3' Parents may be an especially valuable ally and advisor
for the child in a time of crisis and decision. When children enter the legal
system, for example, they often confront concepts and choices that are new and
potentially frightening. Thus, even while the child is working towards personal
independence, the child may need and seek the insight and guidance of a
knowledgeable, experienced parent or guardian. The child's request for the
parent's help is recognized as a positive and appropriate response to the stress-
ful situation.32
By contrast, studies suggest that adolescents from families with high
levels of conflict and low levels of democracy will be less likely to see their
family as a source of help in resolving problems.3 3 Recognizing that many
youth engage in delinquent behavior because communication is poor and con-
flict is high within the home, juvenile court innovators hope that modem
responses to juvenile crime will enhance family relations and improve problem-
solving, communication, and other interpersonal skills in the parent-child
dyad.3 4
Contemporary juvenile justice legislation reflects a clear commitment to
parental involvement in all stages of the juvenile justice system.3 5 Parents are
automatically subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court when a child is
arrested, and parents are generally required to attend court hearings and moni-
tor the child's progress on probation.36 In addition, virtually all of the latest
28 Steinberg, supra note 12, at 263 (noting finding as robust across socioeconomic and
ethnic groups).
29 Elizabeth Oddone-Paolucci et al., A Stepwise Discriminant Analysis of Delinquent and
Nondelinquent Youth, in THE CHANGING FAMILY AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 184 (2000);
Inga-Dora Sigfusdottir et al., The Role of Depressed Mood and Anger in the Relationship
Between Family Conflict and Delinquent Behavior, J. OF YoUTH & ADOLESCENCE 510
(2004).
30 Dickerson & Crase, supra note 26.
3' Steinberg, supra note 12, at 260 (but acknowledging that households of delinquent or
psychologically disturbed youth may be strained both prior to and during adolescence).
32 Fallon & Bowles, supra note 16, at 239, 244; see also Margaret Kerr & Hakan Stattin,
Parenting of Adolescents: Action or Reaction, in CHILDREN'S INFLUENCE ON FAMILY
DYNAMICS: THE NEGLECTED SIDE OF FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 145 (2003) (finding youths'
willingness to tell parents about daily activities as strong indicator of good adjustment).
13 Fallon & Bowles, supra note 16, at 244.
3' Barbara J. Bums et al., Comprehensive Community-Based Interventions for Youth with
Severe Emotional Disorders: Multisystemic Therapy and the Wraparound Process, VOL. 9
J. OF CHILD AND FAM. STUD., No. 3, 285 (2000); Janet Gilbert et al., Applying Therapeutic
Principles to a Family-Focused Juvenile Justice Model (Delinquency), 52 ALA. L. REV.
1153, 1167, 1179, 1184 (2001); Henggeler & Sheidow, supra note 11, at 506-07.
35 Gilbert et al., supra note 34, at 1187-89.
36 See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
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programmatic innovations in the juvenile justice system-including juvenile
drug courts, Unified Family Courts, Functional Family Therapy ("FFT"),
Multi-Systemic Therapy ("MST"), and Multidimensional Treatment Foster
Care ("MDTFC"), among others-recognize the role of parents in the onset,
prevention, and resolution of adolescent delinquent behavior.37 Proponents of
family-focused juvenile justice strategies believe first, that families are in the
best position to rehabilitate children but often lack the skills or resources they
need to do so, and second, that comprehensive therapeutic intervention in the
family will greatly improve the child's prospects for successful rehabilitation
and thereby reduce delinquency and improve public safety. 8
Relying on research that identifies parental supervision, consistency of
discipline, and attachment to parents as the most important factors in prevent-
ing delinquency and reducing recidivism among high-risk youth, family-
focused juvenile justice models seek to engage parents and guardians in the
child's treatment and provide resources and support without alienating the fam-
ily.39 More specifically, family-focused interventions attempt to build support-
ive parent-child relationships, encourage parents to engage in active monitoring
and supervision of children, teach parents to employ positive discipline meth-
ods, and train parents to seek information and advocate on behalf of children in
other systems such as schools, neighborhoods, and communities.4 ° In some
cases, counseling and therapy may be required to stabilize the youth, diffuse
immediate problems or crises, and to decrease anxiety, hostility, or depression
among family members.41
A series of rigorous clinical evaluations have consistently demonstrated
the short and long-term efficacy of family-focused and multi-systemic methods
in engaging families in the treatment process, reducing recidivism among vio-
lent and chronic juvenile offenders, and limiting the number, and therefore the
cost, of out-of-home placements.42 These evaluations have also demonstrated
significant improvements in family functioning, decreases in the child's associ-
ation with delinquent peers, and greater success in the child's educational and
37 For an overview of clinical procedures, policies and rationale for MST, FFT, and
MDTFC, see Bums et al., supra note 34; Henggeler & Sheidow, supra note 11; Cindy M.
Schaeffer & Charles M. Borduin, Long-Term Follow-Up to a Randomized Clinical Trial of
Multisystemic Therapy with Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders, J. oF COUNSELING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 445 (2005); see also U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., JUVENILE DRUG COURTS:
STRATEGIES IN PRACTICE MONOGRAPH 43-45 (2003) (discussing strategies for family
engagement in juvenile drug court); Gilbert et al., supra note 34, at 1168 (recognizing chal-
lenges of juvenile drug courts to include counteracting negative influences within the
family).
38 Gilbert et al., supra note 34, at 1155.
39 Id. at 1172, 1174.
40 Bums et al., supra note 34, at 287-88; Gilbert, supra note 34, at 1172, 1174; Henggeler &
Sheidow, supra note 11, at 508, 513.
41 Gilbert et al., supra note 34, at 1180; Henggeler & Sheidow, supra note 11, at 508.
42 Henggeler & Sheidow, supra note 11, at 515 (documenting results of rigorous evaluation
of MST, FF1, and MDTFC); Schaeffer & Borduin, supra note 37, at 449-51 (reporting
results of MST 13.7 years after initiation of method); see also Gilbert et al., supra note 34, at
1200 (reporting results of a recent study conducted by American Psychological Association
that found that of the over 400 recognized therapy models, the most influential factors in
change was the client and the family).
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occupational activities.4 3 Studies have also found family therapy to be signifi-
cantly more effective than individual therapy in reducing adolescent substance
abuse."
Considering the central place of parents in contemporary juvenile justice
policy, cooperation among the parent, the child, and the child's lawyer is virtu-
ally essential in securing the child's stated objectives in the juvenile case. In
most cases, children will seek the least restrictive detention alternatives upon
arrest and seek community-based or in-home programming at the time of the
child's disposition. By gathering information from parents, the lawyer may
better probe the accuracy, thoroughness, and reliability of diagnostic reports
prepared in anticipation of disposition." By further collaborating with parents,
the child's lawyer may also galvanize the parents' support for the child's
release back into the home and encourage the parents to participate in the
child's treatment.4 6 In some cases, the lawyer may mediate between the parent
and the child, convincing the child on the one hand to participate in pretrial
counseling or family therapy to appease parents, and convincing parents on the
other hand that the child's behavior will improve with wraparound services,
mentoring, and therapeutic intervention. Prosecutors and judges who are con-
vinced of family stability and parental involvement are often more willing to
divert cases from court and less likely to argue for the child's removal from the
home pending trial or at the time of disposition."
3. Exercising the Constitutional Right to Counsel: Building Trust and
Communicating Goals and Objectives
The quality of any attorney-client relationship depends in large part on the
client's ability to determine and communicate objectives that will guide the
legal representation." Collectively, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
envision an attorney-client relationship in which the attorney keeps the client
reasonably informed about circumstances and developments in the case, pro-
vides the client with candid advice about various options and alternatives the
client may consider, follows the client's direction regarding the objectives of
the case, and reasonably consults with the client regarding the means by which
those objectives will be achieved. a9 Unfortunately, the representation of chil-
13 Schaeffer & Borduin, supra note 37, at 451.
I Dickerson & Crase, supra note 26, at 47-48 (reporting that improved communication
patterns in family provide support for child and improve effectiveness, retention and out-
come of drug treatment).
45 Lee Teitelbaum, STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES IN JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS ANNOTATED, P. 9.4, at 90-91 (Robert Shepherd, Jr. ed., 1996) (discuss-
ing standards for effective advocacy on behalf of children at disposition phase of juvenile
case).
46 See Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children's Rights and Legal Representation-The Proper Roles
of Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 423, 427
(1993) (arguing that ensuring participation of deserving parents in the decision-making pro-
cess of the child's attorney will protect society's interest in familial stability).
" See Gilbert et al., supra note 34, at 1194.
48 Schmidt et al., supra note 7, at 176.
41 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2, 1.4, 2.1 (2002). The Model Rules also con-
template that an attorney will maintain a normal attorney-client relationship, as far as reason-
ably possible, with a minor or other client of potentially diminished capacity. Id. at R. 1. 14.
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dren and adolescents may be compromised by the child's limited cognitive and
psychosocial capacities.
Youth often rely on incomplete, albeit evolving, cognitive and linguistic
capacities that may compromise their ability to articulate goals, concerns, and
desires.5" Children may experience additional difficulties communicating with
attorneys, judges, and other court officials because of emotional strain, frustra-
tion, and the lack of familiarity with counsel and the legal process as a whole.5 '
Specifically, research suggests that youth often misunderstand concepts of cli-
ent confidentiality and attorney loyalty, which generally lie at the heart of trust
between a client and his lawyer.52 Some children mistakenly believe that law-
yers are responsible for deciding issues of guilt and punishment or fear that the
lawyer will not advocate his interests if the child admits involvement in the
offense.53 A child who is unpersuaded by the attorney's loyalty may withhold
critical information from the attorney and compromise the lawyer's ability to
provide relevant and useful advice.54 In other instances, the child may omit
information simply because he miscalculates its importance to the case or does
not understand the legal rights at stake.55
In juvenile and criminal cases, the attorney-client relationship embodies a
constitutional right for the accused. The constitutional right to counsel, how-
ever, may be meaningless if the child does not fully understand the lawyer's
role or cannot effectively articulate goals and objectives to the lawyer.5 6 In
these cases, parents may be the only means by which the child may fairly exer-
cise the right to counsel. The parent may initially explain the lawyer's obliga-
tions to the child, encourage the child to be open and honest with the lawyer,
and help the child establish initial rapport with the advocate. The parent, who
is generally familiar with how the child receives and processes information,
may help the lawyer explain concepts in terms the child will understand. Com-
petent parents may also help the lawyer and the child plan meaningful case
50 Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in
Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655, 1688 (1996).
5' Ann Tobey, Youths' Trial Participation as Seen by Youths and Their Attorneys: An
Exploration of Competence-Based Issues, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PER-
SPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 232-33 (2000) [hereinafter YOUTH ON TRIAL]; see also
Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of Child Clients, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 895, 927-28 (1999).
52 Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 3, 15-16 (1997) (discussing results of several studies); Schmidt et al., supra note
7, at 177-78; Tamera Wong, Adolescent Minds, Adult Crimes: Assessing a Juvenile's
Mental Health and Capacity to Stand Trial, 6 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 163, 181
(2002) (discussing survey of 112 juveniles in South Carolina system which showed that
juveniles generally did not understand the role of defense counsel).
5 Grisso, supra note 52, at 19-20.
5 Emily Buss, The Role of Lawyers in Promoting Juveniles' Competence as Defendants, in
YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 51, at 248; Schmidt et al., supra note 7, at 177, 186 (discussing
study which showed that juveniles were less likely than adults to recommend that clients talk
to the attorney and be honest with attorney); Tobey, supra note 5 1, at 225.
55 See Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile
Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577, 629 (2002) (discussing juveniles' limited understanding of
legal rights such as right to counsel and right to remain silent).
56 Catherine J. Ross, Implementing Constitutional Rights for Juveniles: The Parent-Child
Privilege in Context, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 85, 107-08 (2003).
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strategies and choose between various options throughout the case.5 7 Logisti-
cally, children and their lawyers often rely on parents to schedule important
meetings and arrange the child's transportation to and from attorney-client
appointments.
Parental involvement may also ameliorate the coercive nature of law
enforcement or juvenile court proceedings. In the interrogation context, police
may be less likely to abuse or coerce the child when the child's parents are
present. If the police are coercive, the parent may provide moral support the
child needs to withstand assertive police tactics.5 8 In dealings with the child's
lawyer, the parent may serve as a check on the competence and effectiveness of
the legal representation. By following the case closely and asking appropriate
questions, the parent may prevent the lawyer from becoming co-opted by the
system or succumbing to a mechanical representation of the child. Often par-
ents will be in a better position than the lawyer to understand legal problems in
the context of communal, cultural, and familial norms that are relevant to the
child.59 Thus, parental input may ensure that the child's decisions are not
shaped by the monolithic views of the lawyer, but by parents having different
philosophies and experiences.6 °
Parental input may also help the child make better decisions in connection
with the juvenile case. Developmental research suggests that adolescent imma-
turity and inexperience may limit the child's decision-making capacity and pro-
duce poor, shortsighted value judgments. 6  Because children and adolescents
tend to focus on immediate gains and often fail to consider the long-term,
future consequences of a given choice, adolescent decisions about interroga-
tion, waiver of the right to counsel, plea, and disposition may all be based on a
temporary set of beliefs and values that are likely to change over time.62 Par-
ents may help the child understand the long-term value of rehabilitation and
convince the child to follow through on drug-treatment or other rehabilitative
57 Id. at 107.
58 See Haley v. Ohio, 519 U.S. 1011 (1948) (recognizing that police interrogation is inher-
ently coercive and that child may need ally to held understand and protect due process);
Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, Miranda and Jeveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 102-03 (2002) (discussing
police interview tactics designed to make child feel powerless and vulnerable by confining
child in isolated setting, away from friends and family). But see Hillary B. Farber, The Role
of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custodial Interrogations: Friend or Foe?, 41 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1277 (arguing that parents may intentionally or unwittingly join in coercive police
tactics).
19 Cf Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-Cen-
tered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 376-78 (1997) (arguing that lawyer's
unconscious racial bias affects the attorney-client relationship).
60 Hafen, supra note 46, at 445; see also Ross, supra note 56, at 92.
61 Scott, supra note 11, at 555-56, 591; Schmidt et al., supra note 7, at 177; Buss, supra
note 54, at 243.
62 Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders,
in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 51, at 88, 91 (youth tend to favor of immediate conse-
quences such as looking "cool" in the eyes of peers); Buss, supra note 54, at 249; Barry C.
Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of Atkins for Executing and
Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463, 505 (2003-2004); Schmidt et al., supra
note 7, at 179-180; Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology
Goes to Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 51, at 26.
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programs. Parents may also engage the child in a dialogue about the morality
and responsibility of each contemplated decision in the case.63 The parents, for
example, may encourage the child to consider the impact of his choices on his
family and urge the child to accept responsibility for his behavior when
appropriate.
By consulting with parents, the lawyer may tailor legal advice to meet the
special needs and interests of the child. 4 Although the lawyer is bound to
follow the expressed wishes of the child and may not coerce the child to take
any particular course of action, an effective lawyer wants his client to make the
best decisions and choose the best legal alternatives.65 In the end, effective
collaboration between the lawyer, the parent, and the child may empower the
child to make a more thoughtful and well-informed choice among alternatives.
As long as parents remain intertwined in the lives of children and adoles-
cents, it is unlikely that lawyers will develop and sustain an independent rela-
tionship with youth in the juvenile justice system without the direct or indirect
influence of parents. In fact, theories of adolescent development suggest that
lawyers should both expect and encourage youth to consult with parents during
times of decision and stress. 66 Even as adolescents begin to pull away from
parents and transition towards independence, many continue to seek parents for
emotional support and guidance and will draw, consciously and subcon-
sciously, upon the values and perspectives of their family. As parents are
increasingly integrated into the fabric of the juvenile justice system, lawyers,
judges, and other court officials will also look to parents to build healthy inter-
personal skills or repair dysfunctional relationships within the home. In some
cases, parental support may be legally required to satisfy the child's constitu-
tional right to counsel or strategically necessary to secure the child's stated
objectives and improve the quality of the child's legal decisions.
While most would agree that children need the support and advice of par-
ents in the juvenile justice system, many would disagree about how much and
in what manner the parent should be allowed to influence or direct the attorney-
child relationship. Although collaboration among the attorney, the child, and
his parents is useful, it is certainly not without limits. The next section will
explore limits and barriers to effective collaboration in the juvenile justice
context.
63 Farber, supra note 58, at 1304-08 (arguing that when lawyer is appointed as legal advo-
cate in the interrogation context, the parent is free to assume role of moral advisor).
I See Bruce J. Winick, Client Denial and Resistance in the Advance Directive Context:
Reflections on How Attorneys can Identify and Deal with A Psycholegal Soft Spot, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 901, 914-15 (1998).
65 Theories of effective lawyering recognize balanced, non-coercive persuasion as an appro-
priate component of good legal counseling. The lawyer's responsibility is not just to pas-
sively or neutrally list alternatives, but to ensure that the client will consider and evaluate all
of the available options and persuade the client to make the best choice. ROBERT F.
COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 131-32 (1999); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered
Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 517 (1990).
66 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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B. Barriers to Effective Collaboration Among the Attorney, the Child, and
the Partent
Successful collaboration among the lawyer, the parent, and the child
assumes at least three things: (1) Communication between the parent and the
lawyer will not dilute the lawyer's loyalty to the child client; (2) parents will be
willing and able to advance the legal interests of the child-sometimes even at
the expense of their own; and (3) the lawyer will not intentionally or uninten-
tionally substitute the parents' views for those of the child. Today, many vari-
ables complicate the interaction among attorneys, children, and parents in the
juvenile justice system. Parents in juvenile court generally lack expertise in
issues of criminal and juvenile law, are increasingly concerned about their own
potential liability for the conduct of their children, and often have psychologi-
cal and emotional issues that compromise their ability to provide quality, relia-
ble advice to children in the juvenile justice system. In addition, parents who
expect or desire privacy within the family often resent the intrusion of lawyers
who challenge their authority within the home and interfere with their right to
make decisions on behalf of the child. On the other hand, children who per-
ceive that lawyers are overly deferential to the views of the parent, may resent
the loss of autonomy and voice, refuse to cooperate with the attorney, and rebel
against the rehabilitative efforts of the court.
In this Part, I look, first, at ways in which heightened conflict may limit
collaboration and support in families with delinquent children. In section 2, I
consider the risk of misguided advice from parents who tend to be poor legal
advisors for children in juvenile court. In section 3, I look at common areas of
conflict in the attorney-parent relationship including the parents' resentment of
the attorney's interference in private matters of the family and the parents'
desire to usurp control over the attorney-child relationship. In section 4, I study
the increasing potential for legal conflict between accused children and their
parents. Specifically, I consider the parents' exposure to personal liability in
juvenile, dependency, criminal, and civil courts when their children are
arrested. In the final section of this Part, I consider ways in which the absence
of parent-child and attorney-parent privileges limit confidentiality, and thereby
hinder collaboration, in the attorney-child-parent relationship.
1. Conflict and Rejection in Families with Delinquent Children
As noted earlier, families with delinquent children tend to have higher
rates of emotional turmoil and conflict than other families.6 7 Domestic vio-
lence, parental instability, intra-family conflict, and the lack of parental super-
vision, monitoring, or discipline have all been identified as significant
contributors to delinquency.68 Delinquency also appears to be associated with
67 Steinberg, supra note 12, at 260.
68 Gilbert et al., supra note 34, at 1153, 1170, 1174; Oddone-Paolucci et al., supra note 29,
at 185 (noting that high rates of conflict correlate to delinquency); Jennifer S. Parker & Mark
J. Benson, Parent-Adolescent Relations and Adolescent Functioning: Self-Esteem, Substance
Abuse, and Delinquency, Vol. 39 ADOLESCENCE No. 155, 519 (2004) (discussing poor
parental supervision and monitoring as predictors of delinquency); Sigfusdottir et al., supra
note 29, at 511-13, 516-18 (finding that adolescents who live in families with severe argu-
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low levels of parental acceptance, 69 weak bonding between the parent and the
child,7 ° and a history of psychological or mental health problems in the fam-
ily.7" Further, research indicates that juvenile court involvement is frequently
accompanied by the child's disrespect and defiance in the home, dishonesty and
secretiveness with parents, and non-compliance with household chores and
schoolwork. 72 Thus, before comprehensive therapeutic interventions are initi-
ated within the family, the child's arrest may exacerbate conflict and tension
that already exist between the parent and the child.
Even when family relations are not already strained, the onset of court
proceedings often makes communication between parents and children diffi-
cult. Children who are ashamed of their actions or who fear censure and disap-
pointment from family and friends may be afraid or embarrassed to disclose
their misconduct and arrest to parents.7 3 Communication between the child and
the parent may also be compromised by the parent's wide range of potentially
conflicting emotions-fear, anxiety, frustration, remorse, shame, guilt, and pro-
tectiveness.74 Parents, who sometimes achieve their own status or stigma
through the acts, achievements, or misconduct of their children, may be angry
and embarrassed upon discovery of the child's arrest. 75 Recognizing that delin-
quency is still viewed in public opinion as more of a parental failure than a
failure of the child or society, parents often fear that everyone else, including
lawyers, judges, teachers, police officers, and neighbors, blames them.76
Recently, popular culture icon Bill Cosby delivered one of the more public
and controversial speeches on the failures of parents in modem society. 77 Dr.
Cosby lodged a long list of complaints against contemporary parents, including
lack of attention to children's daily whereabouts, complicity in the develop-
ment of materialistic values, inattention to children's attendance and progress at
school, failure to insist on respect from children, and failure to teach proper
grammar and equip children with skills they need to succeed. 78 A number of
ments and violence experience anger which increases their propensity to engage in
delinquency).
69 Oddone-Paolucci et al., supra note 29, at 185.
70 Rick Kosterman et al., Unique Influence of Mothers and Fathers on Their Children's
Antisocial Behavior, 66 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAM. 762, 763 (2004) (arguing that one of
strongest predictors of delinquency is poor bonding to mother and a perception that one's
mother is less caring).
11 Gilbert et al., supra note 34, at 1170; Henggeler & Sheidow, supra note 11, at 506;
Oddone-Paolucci et al., supra note 29, at 185.
72 Kerr, supra note 32, at 130-32, 136.
73 See Judith G. McMullen, You Can't Make Me! How Expectations of Parental Control
over Adolescents Influence the Law, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 603, 639-40 (2004) (discussing
study that showed both delinquent and high achieving teens concealing conduct such as drug
use, theft, vandalism, and driving under the influence from their parents); Ross, supra note
56, at 111 (noting that remorse may lead child to deny wrongdoing to parents).
14 ANNE-MARIE AMBERT, THE EFFECT OF CHILDREN ON PARENTS 98-101 (2000).
15 Farber, supra note 58, at 1277.
76 AMBERT, supra note 74, at 98-101.
17 Bill Cosby, Speech at the 50th Anniversary Commemoration of the Brown v. Topeka
Board of Education Decision, Constitution Hall, Washington, D.C. (May 4, 2004), available
at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/billcosbypoundcakespeech.htm (last visited
August 10, 2005).
78 id.
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recent public opinion polls have affirmed Dr. Cosby's view. In these polls,
respondents have overwhelmingly indicated that parents should be legally
responsible for crimes comnitted by their children.7 9
In some instances, parents blame themselves or begin to blame each other,
causing marriages to deteriorate at a time when the family needs to remain
cohesive.8" Parents in the juvenile justice system also report being stressed,
tired, and unhappy, and sometimes experience a decline in health." Some par-
ents become preoccupied with the child's problems and begin to perform
poorly at work, develop unhealthy eating patterns, and withdraw from relatives,
friends, and neighbors.82 Other parents may withdraw support, warmth, and
trust from the child,83 become physically or emotionally abusive, 84 and in some
cases may force the child out of the home."
The flood of overwhelming emotions often makes it difficult for the parent
to identify goals, establish priorities, and plan effective legal strategies on
behalf of the child.8 6 Because people often make poor decisions under stress,87
parents may lack sufficient insight to choose from among competing moral and
legal concerns in the juvenile case.88 Specifically, parents may struggle
between teaching the child a moral lesson, advocating for the rehabilitative
needs of the child, advancing the legal interests of the child, or maybe even
protecting the legal and safety interests of neighbors, friends, or co-workers
who might be affected by the child's delinquent conduct.89 Some parents may
become paralyzed by grief or anxiety and be unable or unwilling to acknowl-
edge and address the delinquent behavior of a child they have never suspected
71 See, e.g., Peter Applebome, A Carrot and Stick for Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
1996, § 4, p. 5 (citing results of 1996 New York Times/CBS News Poll in which seventy-
two percent of respondents agreed that parents should be held accountable); Gallup, C.N.N.,
U.S.A. Today Poll, Roper Center at University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, Apr.
22, 1999, Lexis Nexis Academic, Question ID USGALLUP.99AP21, R08B (reporting that
fifty-one percent of respondents blamed parents a "great deal" for school shootings like the
one in Littleton, Colorado while 33% of respondents blamed parents a "moderate amount").
80 AMBERT, supra note 74, at 98.
81 Id. at 98-101. Although Ambert's study sample was limited to a middle-class Caucasian
population, Ambert's findings ring true in my own conversations with African-American
parents of lower socio-economic backgrounds in the District of Columbia Superior Court.
82 Id. at 98-99.
83 Id. at 99 (noting that parents may no longer trust the child who has lied, disobeyed or
betrayed their trust); see also Kerr & Stattin, supra note 32, at 130-131 (contradicting most
of previous social science literature on causal/reactive interchange between parents and
delinquent children and instead suggesting that parents' lack of support and attachment is not
the cause of delinquency but the reaction to a delinquent child).
84 Kerr & Stattin, supra note 32, at 136 (noting that parents may express disapproval
through bitterness, sarcasm, or ridicule).
85 Kristin N. Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should
Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 573-74 (2004)
(discussing exclusion of child from home as way to avoid eviction from public housing).
86 Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: What It Is and Why Lawyers Need to Know About
It, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 197
(2000).
87 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 242-43.
88 See id. at 243; Tesler, supra note 86, at 197.
89 Farber, supra note 58, at 1305.
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of any wrongdoing. 90 Parents may even insist on the child's innocence and
refuse to support a guilty plea in the face of overwhelming evidence. For
others, the guilty plea may feel like a concession that they have been bad or
inattentive parents.
2. Parents as Poor Legal Advisors
Parental advice in the juvenile justice context is compromised not only by
psycho-emotional tension within the family, but also by the parents' lack of
expertise in the law and practice of juvenile court. Parents are neither trained
in advocacy, nor knowledgeable about the rights of an accused child.9' Parents
frequently fail to appreciate the risks associated with the exercise and waiver of
the child's constitutional rights9 2 and often share a misguided and exaggerated
view of what the juvenile justice system can accomplish. Parents may force or
encourage the child to plead guilty so the child can get treatment and services
without recognizing the label "treatment facility" as a euphemism for juvenile
jail.9 3 In my own experience as a juvenile defender in the District of Columbia,
parents often seek police or court intervention to get mental health services,
drug treatment, or general supervision for unruly children, but frequently report
general disappointment in their loss of control over treatment, the general lack
of services in the system, and the child's negative response to a poorly planned
disposition. Similarly, parents often initially view the probation officer as a
benevolent ally in their efforts to rehabilitate the child but later come to recog-
nize the officer as an agent of the court with the power to revoke community-
based privileges and incarcerate the child.
A study of police interrogation strategies with children exposes both the
value and limitations of legal advice from parents. Traditionally, judges, legis-
lators, and child advocates presume that parental guidance will improve the
child's decisions regarding interrogation and the waiver of Miranda rights.94
As a result, some states deem juvenile confessions per se involuntary and unre-
90 Kerr & Stattin, supra note 32, at 131; Winick, supra note 64, at 904 (discussing denial as
a defense mechanism that operates unconsciously to disavow external reality and avoid inter-
nal conflict and anxiety about those things that would be consciously intolerable).
91 Ross, supra note 56, at 113.
92 See, e.g., In re Christopher T., 740 A.2d 69, 71 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (reversing
adjudication for violation of the child's right to counsel after child's mother initially waived
counsel for her child because she "did not realize the gravity of the situation"); Farber, supra
note 58, at 1291 (discussing adults' limited comprehension of Miranda and discussing study
in which only 42.3% of adults expressed adequate understanding of each of four warnings
when asked to paraphrase them).
93 Juvenile institutions often expose incarcerated youth to physical and/or mental abuse. For
evidence of physical and mental abuse in juvenile facilities, see Colorado, http://www.hrw.
org/reports/1997/usacol/; Georgia, http://www.hrw.org/reports/l1996/Us.htm; and Maryland,
http://www.hrw.orglreports/1999/maryland/ (last visited July 26, 2005); see also Amnesty
International, Betraying the Young: Human Rights Violations Against Children in the US
Justice System, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510571998?open&of=ENG-
USA (last visited July 26, 2005).
" Farber, supra note 58, at 1286-88 (discussing two common tests to determine validity of
Miranda waiver to include a per se approach in which the child must be allowed to consult
with an adult advisor and a totality of the circumstances test in which the parent's presence is
viewed as a positive factor in the voluntariness analysis).
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liable unless a parent or guardian is present at the time of questioning.9 5 In
jurisdictions where voluntariness is determined by a judicial evaluation of the
totality of the circumstances, judges generally view the parent's presence as a
positive factor ameliorating the threat of coercion. 96 Recently, however, schol-
ars have begun to question the presumptive advantage of parental guidance in
the interrogation context.97 Commentators recognize that the potential for con-
flicts between the interests of children and their parents is significant and worry
that adults themselves do not adequately comprehend Miranda rights. 98 In
many cases, parents have intentionally or unintentionally aligned with law
enforcement officers in coercive tactics to force children to confess to criminal
conduct.9 9 In some cases, parents believe they have a moral obligation to con-
vince their children to confess; in others, parents mistakenly believe that a con-
fession will result in dismissal or reduction of charges against the child. "
Limited legal experience not only affects those parents who seek treatment
for their children, but it also affects those who believe in their child's inno-
cence. For example, notwithstanding her belief that Lionel was just playing
with Tiffany and did not intend to hurt her, it is unlikely that Lionel Tate's
mother fully appreciated the likelihood that her son would be convicted and
sentenced to an adult prison. In juvenile courts, parents are often surprised by
the low rates of acquittal and high rates at which Fourth and Fifth Amendment
motions are denied by juvenile judges. The parents' limited experience in the
juvenile justice system, thus, compromises their ability to evaluate and choose
among options available to the accused child.
The risk of poor legal advice from parents has significant implications for
judges, policymakers, and child advocates. The limited competence of parents
on issues of juvenile law suggests that judges and legislatures should look to
lawyers, not parents, to counsel children on issues of Miranda, waiver of the
right to counsel, and pleas."0 ' The limits of parental wisdom also suggest that
the child's lawyer should be cautious in encouraging children to seek the advice
of parents and be diligent in educating parents about the law, practice, and
procedure of the juvenile justice system. More detailed strategies for moderat-
ing parental advice are discussed in Part II.
9' See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-511 (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-137 (2003);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (1991).
96 See, e.g., In re A.M., 360 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2004) (considering failure to contact child's
mother as one of factors important to finding that confession was involuntary); State v.
Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1110 (N.J. 2000) (indicating that court should consider absence of
parents as highly significant factor in evaluating whether child's waiver was knowing, vol-
untary and intelligent).
17 Farber, supra note 58.
98 Id. at 1291-92. For a more detailed discussion of potential legal conflicts in the parent-
child dyad, see infra Part II.D.
99 Id. at 1289, 1295-96.
'o Id. at 1277.
101 See id. at 1308 (proposing reform that would require presence of counsel for consulta-
tion with juveniles in the interrogation context). Some states now prohibit the child from
waiving the right to counsel without first consulting with counsel. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 2A:4A-39 (1937); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-725 (1976).
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3. Tension in the Attorney-Parent Dyad
Tensions within the attorney-parent relationship further complicate the
legal representation of children. Parents often resent the intrusion of lawyers in
the decision-making of the family and may attempt to usurp control over the
child's legal representation or ignore the attorney altogether. In some cases, the
parents' resentment may arise out of the parents' hostility to the lawyer's
efforts to "get the child off' or help the child avoid responsibility for his con-
duct. In other cases, the parents' resentment may arise out of what the parent
perceives to be judgment or condemnation by the lawyer.
a. The "Intrusion" of Lawyers
While some parents welcome what they believe will be help from the
juvenile court, many others resent the intrusion of the government into the
sanctity of the family. Thus, lawyers for children in the juvenile justice system
often find themselves caught between the constitutional rights of children and
the constitutional rights of parents to raise children in privacy, without the
undue influence of a court-appointed advocate. As late as 2000, the Supreme
Court reiterated its respect for the fundamental liberty interests of parents in
"the care, custody and control of their children."' 02 Although the right of par-
ents to direct and raise children is not absolute,"0 3 traditionally, parents have
been allowed to decide for children in areas of religion, education, medical
treatment, finances, and discipline." ° As the Court said in Schall v. Martin:
[U]nlike adults, [children] are always in some form of custody .... Children, by
definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are
102 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (striking down visitation statute and noting
that "[t]he liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children-is
perhaps one of the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court").
103 The Court has limited parental autonomy in areas of abortion, child labor, "infant mar-
riage," compulsory education, access to necessary medical treatment, and freedom from
abuse and severe physical or mental deprivation. See, e.g., Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979) (striking down parental consent for abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (holding that state cannot give parents an absolute and possibly arbitrary
veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy);
Prince v. Mass, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding conviction of parent under child labor laws
for allowing child to sell religious literature in public); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (noting that although state cannot compel attendance at public schools, there is
no question that state can require some school).
1o Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 n.13 (1986) (plurality) (invalidating
federal regulations requiring medical treatment of handicapped infants without parental con-
sent); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (recognizing "fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody and management of their child" and requiring
clear and convincing evidence in proceedings to terminate parental rights); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (exempting Amish children from compulsory formal edu-
cation beyond the eighth grade); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-43 (1968)
(upholding ban on sale of sex-related materials to minors); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35
(1925) (finding that compulsory public school attendance unreasonably interferes with
parental right to direct he upbringing and education of children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down statute prohibiting the teaching of any foreign language to a
child before eighth grade).
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assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters,
the State must play its part as parens patriae.
10 5
Parents' rights advocates have similarly argued that "deserving" parents
are uniquely qualified to make decisions on behalf of their children, especially
when the children are involved in a legal proceeding. °6 In the reality of an
urban juvenile court, parents often see the assertion of juvenile court jurisdic-
tion as a mark of their own failure or lack of control over their children. Like-
wise, parents often view the interference of the child's lawyer as a critique on
their own competence and success as a parent.
Tensions in the attorney-parent relationship are particularly great in the
pre-trial stages of the juvenile case when the lawyer and the parents have not
developed a rapport and the parents do not understand of the rights of the child
and the obligations of the child's lawyer. The early stages of the case also
involve the most uncertainty for the lawyer and the parents. While the parents
want definitive advice and quick resolution of the juvenile case, the child's
lawyer is obligated to thoroughly investigate factual allegations and explore
possible defenses before rendering fair and meaningful guidance to the child. 1
0 7
Parents who want immediate rehabilitative services for their children may
become frustrated with the child's lawyer, and the juvenile court system as a
whole, when significant treatment and rehabilitation are delayed until after an
adjudication of guilt. Conflict may arise when the parent refuses or is reluctant
to allow the child to remain or return home pending trial and the lawyer has
little or nothing to offer the parent by way of services and intervention for the
family. In some cases, the lawyer's need to expose shortcomings in the child's
family to obtain services for the child or to portray the parents negatively to
earn sympathy for an accused child may exacerbate the parents' hostility
toward the lawyer.
Parents may also harbor hostility about lawyers based on negative portray-
als of lawyers in the media, local stereotypes regarding public defenders, or
their own prior unpleasant interactions with attorneys.' O8 Many view the
child's lawyer less as an ally for the child than as a representative of the juve-
nile justice system as a whole. In these cases, the parents may encourage the
child to waive the right to counsel altogether or, when the lawyer is appointed,
sabotage the child's trust in the lawyer by making disparaging comments or
neglecting to pass important messages and refusing to arrange for and coordi-
nate meetings between the child and the attorney.
b. Parents Usurp Control Over Attorney-Client Relationship
In a delinquency case, parents often construe their own constitutional right
to raise and control children as a right to control the child's legal representation
and make critical decisions for the child in juvenile court. Some parents may
view control over the child's juvenile case as minimal compensation for the
105 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
"o Hafen, supra note 46, at 427.
107 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 5 (2002).
i08 Winick, supra note 64, at 911.
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time, money, and emotional energy they will spend in juvenile court.'09 Other
parents who are not ready to cede authority to an immature adolescent may
become angry when the child appears to take the lawyer's advice as permission
to disobey parents, keep secrets, or violate the privacy and confidences of the
family. Philosophical tensions may also surface between parents and lawyers
who have different parenting styles or bring different cultural and religious
beliefs to the discussion." " Strategic conflicts may emerge when the parent's
desire to secure rehabilitative services for the child or teach the child a lesson
conflicts with the lawyer's obligation to pursue the client's expressed interest in
the least restrictive alternative."1
The parent's effort to control the child's legal representation may be even
greater when the parent pays for the services of the child's counsel"' or when
the parent learns that he may be required to pay for treatment if the child is
adjudicated.113 Interesting ethical questions arise when the parent voluntarily
hires an attorney for the child or when the court orders the parent to compen-
sate the attorney for his services. Parents who pay for the attorney will gener-
ally expect to guide key decisions in the case while attorneys, who are bound
by rules of professional responsibility, owe continuing loyalty to the client and
may not permit interference from a third-party payer. 14 Parents who feel
excluded from the attorney-client relationship may threaten to withhold legal
fees and refuse to cooperate with either the attorney or the child. At a mini-
mum, most parents expect the child's lawyer to keep them informed about
important developments in the case." 5 Parents who do not get adequate infor-
mation from the child's lawyer may forge alliances with prosecutors and proba-
tion officers, often to the detriment of the child.
The parents' effort to control decisions in the child's juvenile case does
not always lead to conflict in the attorney-parent dyad. In fact, there are many
advocates who believe parents are better suited than children to set goals and
objectives for the lawyer. 1 6 These lawyers willingly look to parents for direc-
tion and often fail to consult with their own clients. When the child's attorney
is overly deferential to the views of the parent and refuses to advocate for the
expressed wishes of the child, the child loses the only opportunity he has to
participate in the process and influence the outcome of his case. Research in
the psychology of procedural justice suggests that offenders who are denied an
109 Cf Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, Abandoning Children to Their Autonomy:
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 449, 483-84
(1996) (discussing fear that denial of parental rights may have long term effect of reducing
parental commitment to childrearing); Scott, supra note 11, at 551 (recognizing that parental
rights and authority might be viewed as legal compensation for the burden of responsibility
to provide food, shelter, health care, affection and education).
ll0 Marrus, supra note 7, at 320-21.
'". See id. at 321.
112 Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1819, 1844-47 (1996).
"'3 See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
114 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f)(3) (2002); Moore, supra note 112, at
1845-47.
115 Moore, supra note 112, at 1827.
116 Hafen, supra note 46, at 427.
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opportunity to participate effectively in the process of justice are likely to resist
treatment, become apathetic, and lose respect for the law." 7 In a delinquency
case, meaningful participation not only allows the child to feel like he is a
valued member of society whose opinion is worth considering, but it also pro-
vides the child with a legitimate opportunity to influence the judge's final deci-
sion and gives the child greater confidence in the accuracy of the results.118 As
the Supreme Court recognized in In re Gault, the appearance and actuality of
fairness, impartiality and orderliness may be just as, if not more, therapeutic
than rehabilitative programming.11 9 That is, the child's perception as to
whether he or she is being listened to and whether his or her opinion is being
considered is integral to the child's rehabilitation.120 Offenders who experi-
ence the legal procedure as unfair are less likely to accept judicial outcomes
and take responsibility for rehabilitation.121
4. Legal Conflicts in the Parent-Child Dyad
Delinquency cases are unique in the character and extent of legal conflicts
that might surface between children and their parents. Juvenile justice issues
have been at the forefront of American policy since the late twentieth century.
As policymakers search for new responses to the perceived growth in juvenile
crime, victims of juvenile misconduct are finding recourse in an expanding
array of fora. Victims may not only seek restitution from children in juvenile
court, but they may also seek restitution and accountability from the parents of
delinquent children in juvenile, civil, and adult criminal proceedings. In the
next four subsections, I examine the parents' exposure to liability through juve-
nile justice legislation, child protective and dependency actions, criminal liabil-
ity statutes, and tort or other civil liability provisions.
As the legal terrain becomes more complicated, the potential for conflict
between parents and children is substantial. Historical presumptions that par-
ents are the most competent, and most likely, advocates for the best interests of
their children are increasingly giving way to the self-interested motives of par-
ents and a growing reluctance among parents to put the needs of one child over
those of other family members. 122
a. Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
In an effort to hold parents accountable for the behavior of their children,
policymakers now require parents to participate in every aspect of the juvenile
justice system. Pursuant to modern juvenile justice legislation, parents are
117 Juan Ramirez, Jr. & Amy D. Ronner, Voiceless Billy Budd: Melville's Tribute to the
Sixth Amendment, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 103, 120 (2004).
118 Allen E. Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Nonin-
strumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. OF PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 952-
53 (1990).
119 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
120 Ramirez & Ronner, supra note 117, at 114; Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCH. PuB. POL. & L. 184, 197 (1997) (discussing medical
context in which giving the child voice and choice in whether to participate in or refuse
treatment can "increase the therapeutic efficacy of treatment").
121 Ramirez & Ronner, supra note 117, at 93-94, 111, 114.
122 Farber, supra note 58, at 1279.
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automatically notified of the child's arrest, generally subject to the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court, and are increasingly required to attend court hearings
under the threat of contempt.' 23 Parents must also remain integrally involved
in efforts to rehabilitate the child and may be fined for failing to bring the child
to court when promised.124 In some jurisdictions, parents will be asked to
notify court officials when the child violates conditions of release or proba-
tion;' 25 and in others, parents may be required to post bond to ensure the
child's compliance with treatment.' 2 6 Parents are also increasingly required to
participate in treatment, either by themselves or with their children. The juve-
nile court may order parents to participate in family counseling, parenting skills
classes, individual therapy, or community service.' 27 The court may also order
parents to submit to drug testing or undergo psychiatric or psychological evalu-
ations.12 8 Parents may also experience more subtle inconveniences from equip-
ment that requires the family to disable phone features and disconnect Internet
connections to accommodate GPS tracking systems that monitor the child's
movement on probation.
While these provisions may be useful in efforts to enhance the child's
rehabilitation and implement family-focused juvenile justice strategies, they are
also likely to create conflict and tension within the family. Parents who are
required to attend multiple court hearings and related activities miss work, lose
pay, incur the costs of transportation to and from appointments, and often need
123 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-31(5) (1995) (court may make parent party to the juvenile
proceeding); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2325.01 (2004) (parent may be found in civil contempt
for failing to comply with participation orders); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1641 (2000) (duty of
parent to appear at all hearings subject to contempt); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 712A6a
(West 1948) (parent who fails to attend may be held in contempt and ordered to pay fines);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.154 (West 1946) (parent who fails to attend may be held in
contempt and subject to arrest); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 42-310 (West 1930) (court may
hold parent in contempt and issue a bench warrant when the parent fails to participate).
124 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.155 (1998) (authority to require parents to attend, par-
ticipate in treatment); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-5 (2005) (authority to require parents to par-
ticipate in disposition plan for the child);IDAHO CODE § 20-522 (Michie 1947) (jurisdiction
to require parents to sign probation contract and comply with conditions of the child's proba-
tion); IND. CODE § 31-37-19-24 (1972) (authority to order parents' participation in child's
care, treatment, rehabilitation); S.D.CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-51 (2004) (parent may be held
in civil contempt if he promises to bring child before the court but fails to do so).
125 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.155(b)(2) (1998).
126 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.180 (1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 7303-5.3
(1910); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-244 (2005).
127 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT § 47.12.155 (1998) (parents may be ordered to participate in
treatment); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-234 (1956) (court may order parent to complete
community service); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-330 (Michie 1998) (parents may be sentenced
to parental training program if juvenile is found delinquent); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
330(a)(9) (Michie 1998) (parent may be ordered to complete community service); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-2-919 (2005) (guardians of delinquents can be sentenced to attend parental
training program); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.185 (West 1949) (parents may be ordered to com-
plete community service); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-28 (Michie Supp. 1995) (parents may
be ordered to participate in counseling program).
128 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-330 (Michie 1998) (permitting court to order child or members
of child's family to submit to physical, psychiatric or psychological evaluations); N. C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 7B-2702 (1999) (permitting court to order medical, surgical, psychiatric, or
psychological evaluation or treatment of juvenile or parent).
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to arrange childcare for other children.129 Parents may especially resent court-
ordered evaluations that are not only time consuming and intrusive, but that
also have the potential to further embarrass and label the parent. To reduce the
amount of time the family will have to spend in juvenile court, some parents
may encourage the child to plead guilty or prefer to have the child placed in
out-of-home, residential placements rather than participate in family counseling
or monitor the child on probation. When a mother is compelled to report viola-
tions to the court, she essentially becomes a witness for the state against the
child and is no longer a safe-haven for open communication and support for the
child. Likewise, when a father faces civil contempt for failing to ensure his
child's compliance with probation, he may turn against the child and portray
the child as unruly and uncontrollable.
Parents also face considerable financial liability in juvenile court.
Although every state guarantees an accused child the right to counsel, many
states look to parents to reimburse all or part of the child's legal fees depending
upon the parents' financial ability. 130 Many jurisdictions also hold the parent
jointly or independently liable for restitution to victims of juvenile crime.13 '
The court may order restitution to cover lost or damaged property as well as
medical, dental, or funeral expenses of the victim. 132 Even where no civilians
are injured, the judge may order parents to pay court costs and fines' 3 3 or to
reimburse the state for the expense of detention, commitment, evaluations, spe-
cial schools, counseling, or other treatment necessary for the child. 134 Parents
may also be required to pay for their own court-ordered treatment. 135 When
parents refuse to pay fees, restitution, and other expenses, the court may enter a
civil judgment, hold the parent in criminal contempt, or place a claim or lien on
129 Farber, supra note 58, at 1297-98.
130 See, e.g., ALA CODE § 12-15-11 (1995); ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-221 (1956); GA.
CODE ANN. § 15-11-8 (2005); Ky. REV. CODE ANN. § 610.060 (1970); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 43-21-619 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1525 (2005); N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN § 78-
2002 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419C.203 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-267 (1950);
WASH. REv.CODE § 13.40.145 (1961).
131 See, e.g., D.W.L. v. State, 821 So. 2d 246 (Ala. 2001) (father ordered to pay $1000 of
the child's $7000 restitution order for the child's burglary); ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 47.12.155(b)(3) (1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-330(a)(7) (Michie 1998); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16- 2320.01 (2005).
132 See, e.g., D.W.L. v. State, 821 So. 2d 246 (Ala. 2001) (father ordered to pay $1000 of
the child's $7,000 restitution order for the child's burglary); ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 47.12.155(b)(3) (1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-330(a)(7) (Michie 1998); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16- 2320.01 (2005).
133 See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. § 12-15-11 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-330(a)(6), (8)
(Michie 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-4 (2004).
134 See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. § 12-15-11 (1995); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.12.155 (1998);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-234.D (1956); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-330(a)(13)(A) (Michie
1998); Ky. REV. STAT ANN. § 610.060 (2000); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-619 (1972);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1525 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-290 (Michie 1988); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2704 (1999).
135 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.155 (Michie 1998).
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the parents' property. 13 6 A parent who is found in criminal contempt may be
incarcerated. 137
In imposing greater accountability on parents and recognizing the parent
as a formal party in delinquency proceedings, several states have awarded par-
ents an independent right to counsel in the child's juvenile case. 138 Because
rules of professional conduct generally limit the lawyer's ability to communi-
cate with a represented party, 139 the child's lawyer may not be able to commu-
nicate directly with the child's parents. In addition, the parents' lawyer, who is
rightly concerned about the legal interests of the parent, may develop case strat-
egies that exonerate the parents but ultimately harm the child's position in juve-
nile court.
b. Child Protective and Dependency Actions
Parents of children who engage in chronic or recurring delinquent behav-
ior may find themselves in child protective or dependency proceedings. In
many states, child protective statutes recognize a "neglected child" as one who
lacks proper care, control, or supervision from parents or whose lax parental
supervision is likely to endanger the child's morals, health, or general wel-
fare.' 4 ° A child who engages in delinquent conduct while he is left unattended
or inadequately supervised may fall within the purview of these statutes. 141 A
136 See, e.g., ALA CODE § 12-15-11 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.230 (Michie 1998);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-221 (1956); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-619 (1972); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 27-20-31.21 (1943).
137 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-11.1 (1995) (parent who fails to assist child in complying
with probation may be held in criminal contempt and fined up to $300 and imprisoned for up
to 30 days).
138 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-221 (1956); IDAHO CODE § 20-514 (Michie 1947);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29 (1958); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.211 (1949); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 62D.100 (1957); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, ch. I § 24 (1910); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-110
(1976). Notwithstanding these examples, parents are not always entitled to representation of
counsel in juvenile court. Juvenile statues that subject parents to monetary fines, treatment
costs, possible incarceration, and mandatory participation in parenting-skills classes and
other treatment programs are not always accompanied by a statutory right to counsel for the
parents. In the District of Columbia, for example, new restitution and parental participation
statutes were not accompanied by a parental right to counsel.
"9 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002) ("In representing a client, a lawyer
shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent
of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.").
4 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-1 (1995) (defining child who is neglected to included child
who is in a condition or surroundings or who is under improper or insufficient guardianship
or control as to endanger the morals, health or general welfare of the child); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-2301(9) (A)(ii) (2001) (defining child who is neglected to include child who is without
proper parental care or control, subsistence, education or other control necessary for his or
her physical, mental or emotional health); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119 § 24 (1958)
(defining neglected child to include child who is without proper discipline, growing up in
conditions dangerous to his character development or who has a parent who is unwilling,
incompetent or unavailable to provide care, discipline or attention the child needs).
': The use of neglect statutes in response to juvenile crime is not foreign in the District of
Columbia. In one of my own recent cases, a mother was found to be neglectful after her
three sons were found to possess significant quantities of drugs in her home without her
knowledge.
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parent who is found to be neglectful may lose parental rights not only with
respect to the delinquent child, but also with respect to other children in the
family.' 42 The parents may also be subject to in-home supervision or monitor-
ing by government officials and be ordered to complete parenting classes, par-
ticipate in family counseling, or submit to medical or psychiatric treatment.14 3
As in the juvenile justice context, neglect or dependency proceedings
carry a number of collateral consequences for the parents. Parents face stigma
in the community, miss additional time and money from work, and resent the
intrusion of the government into their homes. When neglect proceedings arise
out of the child's misconduct, the allegations have the perverse consequence of
pitting the parents against the child. As in the juvenile case, the parents may
portray the delinquent child as uncontrollable and even voluntarily relinquish
rights over the delinquent child to prevent the removal of other children from
the home. The parents may also encourage the child to submit to treatment and
take personal responsibility for his conduct in the juvenile case so that neglect
proceedings will be closed.
c. Criminal Liability for Parents
The potential for criminal liability for parents creates a third source of
legal conflict between parents and children in the juvenile justice system.' 44
Criminal parental liability statutes, which were written into state codes years
ago, have waxed and waned in popularity.1 4 1 Over the last two decades,
policymakers have re-introduced parental liability as a potential response to
growing concerns about declining public safety and the ability of parents to rear
and control their children. 146 Under these provisions, parents whose children
engage in delinquency may be charged with endangering the welfare, or con-
tributing to the delinquency, of a minor. 147
142 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-71 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2301(A)(v), 16-2320
(2001); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119 § 24 (1958).
143 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-71 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2320 (2001).
14 Most obviously, the parent may be investigated as a suspect or co-conspirator in the
child's crime. While that investigation would create a clear conflict of interest between the
parent and the child, I am more concerned in this section with the criminal liability that
parents may face regardless of whether they are a suspect themselves.
145 Naomi R. Cahn, Pragmatic Questions About Parental Liability Statutes, 1996 Wis. L.
REV. 399, 406-12 (1996) (tracing trends in parental liability legislation).
146 Id. at 406-12; Peter Applebome, A Carrot and Stick for Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES, June
16, 1996, sec. 4, p. 5.
147 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-13 (1995) (parent guilty of misdemeanor for willfully
aiding child in becoming delinquent and may be fined not to exceed $500 or ordered to
complete hard labor for county for not more than 12 months); CAL. PENAL CODE § 272
(West 1999) (parent guilty of misdemeanor for any act or omission that contributes to the
delinquency of a minor and may be fined not to exceed $2500 or imprisoned in county jail
for not more than one year); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 530.60 (LexisNexis Supp. 1996) (parent
guilty of misdemeanor when parent fails to exercise reasonable diligence to prevent child
from becoming delinquent); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:92.2 (Supp. 1999) (parent may be
fined $25 - $250 or incarcerated for 30 days for allowing child to become member of known
criminal street gang); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1939) (parent guilty of misde-
meanor when parent "refuses to exercise reasonable diligence in the control of child to pre-
vent him from becoming a juvenile delinquent"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-316.1 (1999) (parent
guilty of misdemeanor when parent knowingly or willfully causes, aids or encourages juve-
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Parental liability statutes are designed to satisfy several goals including
compensating victims through criminal fines, encouraging parents to exercise
greater control over their children, reducing delinquency, and punishing parents
for bad parenting.' 48 Proponents of these statutes justify parental accountabil-
ity measures on theories of incentive, deterrence, and retribution.' 4 9 Legisla-
tors hope the threat of sanctions will motivate parents to spend more time with
children, pay more attention to where children go and with whom, and develop
a system of rewards and punishment that will encourage desired behavior or
discourage undesired behavior.' 50 When parents fail to raise children with
good morals or fail to exercise immediate control over the child's conduct,
advocates of parental liability believe punishment is warranted.151 Proponents
of criminal liability provisions also hope that the threat of fines and imprison-
ment for the parent will motivate the child to refrain from delinquent behavior
out of love, affection, and attachment to parents.
152
In their broadest form, criminal liability statutes hold parents responsible
for any act, including inadequate supervision that contributes to the child's mis-
conduct or brings the child under the jurisdiction of the juvenile or criminal
court. 5 While most offenses within these statutes are misdemeanors,' 54 a few
states consider it a felony to contribute to the delinquency of a minor. 155 Par-
ents who are found guilty under any of these provisions may be fined, ordered
to participate in parenting classes, placed on probation, or incarcerated.' 56 In
nile to commit act that could be adjudicated delinquent); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 856 (Supp.
2000) (parent guilty of misdemeanor punishable by up to year in jail or fine not to exceed
$1000 for encouraging minor to become delinquent or runaway; and parent causing minor to
associate with street gang is guilty of felony, punishable by fine not to exceed $3000); Wis.
STAT. § 948.40 (1957) (person responsible for child's welfare guilty of misdemeanor if dis-
regards welfare of child in way that contributes to child's delinquency).
148 Cahn, supra note 145, at 409-10.
149 See McMullen, supra note 73, at 641 (discussing general rationale and policy for vari-
ous civil and criminal parental liability measures).
iso See id. at 641-44.
"I' Cahn, supra note 145, at 409-10 (discussing strong public outcry for statutes that
criminalize parents when their children commit crimes); McMullen, supra note 73, at 644-46
(but arguing that punishment should be determined by the parents effort or lack of effort to
supervise the child and not by the success or failure of those efforts).
152 McMullen, supra note 73, at 643.
153 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-1301 (1947) (granting counties or cities authority to
enact ordinances that penalize parents if child engages in conduct that brings him within the
jurisdiction of juvenile or adult courts); Hill v. State, 381 So. 2d 91 (Ala. 1979) (criminal
conviction for causing delinquency by not providing education to the child); see also Cahn,
supra note 145, at 409-10 (discussing strong public outcry for statutes that criminalize par-
ents when their children commit crimes); McMullen, supra note 73, at 644-46 (but arguing
that punishment should be determined by the parents effort or lack of effort to supervise the
child and not by the success or failure of those efforts).
154 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-13 (1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1999); IowA
CODE § 709A.1 (1946); IDAHO CODE § 32-1301 (1947); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 530.060
(Michie Supp. 1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (1939); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-316.1
(1999).
155 See, e.g., OKE. STAT. tit. 21 § 856.1 (Supp. 2000): WIs. STAT § 948.40 (1957).
156 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-1301 (1947) (violators may be fined up to $1000 or be
ordered to complete parenting classes in lieu of fine); see also Cahn, supra note 145, at 409-
10 (discussing strong public outcry for statutes that criminalize parents when their children
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California, for example, a parent who contributes to the delinquency of a minor
will be guilty of a misdemeanor and may be fined up to $2500, imprisoned for
a year, or placed on probation for up to five years.157 In Oklahoma, any parent
or other adult who causes, aids, or encourages a minor to participate in a drug
crime is guilty of a felony and may be imprisoned for up to twenty years and/or
fined up to $200,000. 58
Criminal liability provisions arguably create even greater conflict in the
parent-child and attorney-parent dyads than parental accountability provisions
in juvenile court. A parent who is convicted in criminal court may face addi-
tional collateral consequences such as the loss of voting rights, health care ben-
efits, public housing, food stamps, federal education assistance, driving
privileges, and employment opportunities.15 9 The threat of criminal and related
sanctions may also cause the parent to lash out in anger or violence and may
further deteriorate already tenuous relationships between delinquent children
and their parents.' 6 ° In addition, because many of these statutes, either by plain
language or by judicial interpretation, may exonerate the parent who demon-
strates that he has made reasonable efforts to control the child, 16 1 parents have
an incentive to dissociate themselves from the child's conduct and again label
the child unruly and uncontrollable. The parent may also consent to emancipa-
tion proceedings, eject the child from the home, or withhold consent when the
juvenile court is inclined to release the child back into the community after the
child's arrest.
e. Tort Actions and Civil Parental Liability Statutes
Parents may also be sued for violations of tort law and civil liability stat-
utes when their children commit crimes that injure the person or property of
others.' 6 2 Like the criminal statutes, civil parental liability provisions were
commit crimes); McMullen, supra note 73, at 644-46 (but arguing that punishment should
be determined by the parents effort or lack of effort to supervise the child and not by the
success or failure of those efforts).
157 CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1999).
158 OL. STAT. tit. 21 § 856.1 (Supp. 2000).
159 MARC MAUER & MEDA CHESNEY-LIND, INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT 5 (2002).
16 Cahn, supra note 145, at 417.
161 See, e.g., Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (1993) (holding that parent who makes
reasonable efforts to control child but is not actually able to do so is not guilty of contribut-
ing to delinquency of minor); see also ALA. CODE § 12-15-13 (1995) (requires showing that
parent "willfully" aided the child in becoming delinquent); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10
(McKinney 1939) (requires showing that parent failed or refused to exercise reasonable
care); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-316.1 (1999) (requires showing that adult "willfully" caused
juvenile to become delinquent).
162 For a representative sample of civil parental liability statutes, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-661 (1999) (parents liable for any act or malicious or willful conduct of a minor which
results in injury to others); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.1 (Deering 1999) (parents/guardians
liable for willful misconduct of minors); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572 (2005) (parents jointly
and severally liable for damage caused by minor's willful and malicious act); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10 § 3922 (1975) (parents liable for willful or reckless destruction of property); ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 740 115/1 (West 1999) (parents responsible for willful or malicious
acts of minor that causes injury or damage to property); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 85G
(1958) (parental liability for willful act of child that causes death, injury or property dam-
age); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-15 (West 1937) (parents liable for willful destruction of
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written many years ago, but have gained renewed popularity among politicians
and victims who seek to hold parents responsible for the destructive acts of
their children and hope to fill gaps left in the compensation of victims at com-
mon law. 163 A typical civil parental liability statute will hold the parent strictly
liable for the willful or malicious conduct of a child for whom they have the
responsibility of direct supervision."6 Upon a finding of liability, the statutes
generally require parents to reimburse victims for the repair or replacement of
property or to pay medical expenses in the case of personal injury. 16 5 While
many civil liability statutes cap parental liability at $5,000 or less,1 66 at least
two states allow liability up to $25,000,167 and a number of states set no liabil-
ity limits in the case of property damage. 168
While civil liability provisions are important for the compensation of vic-
tims, they, like other parental accountability measures, create an additional
layer of conflict between parents and children in juvenile court. These statutes
may cause considerable financial hardship for parents and may diminish, rather
than reinforce, parental supervision and care. 169 Because civil parental liability
statutes only hold the parent liable when it is clear that the parent is responsible
for the care and control of the child,17 ° the statutes may create a perverse disin-
centive for some to continue parenting responsibility. In addition, civil provi-
property by infant under eighteen); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-37 (2005) (parents liable for
malicious or willful conduct of child that causes personal or property damage to others);
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW. § 3-112 (McKinney 1999) (parents liable for willful, malicious or
unlawful damage to property); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.765 (2003) (parents liable for inten-
tional or reckless tort of children); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon 1999) (parents
liable for property damage cause by willful and malicious conduct of child and for child's
negligent conduct if negligence is reasonable attributed to parent's negligence); see also
Rhonda M. Andrews, The Justice of Parental Accountability: Hypothetical Disinterested
Citizens and Real Victims' Voices in the Debate Over Expanded Parental Liability, 75
TEMP. L. REV. 375, 398 (2002) (noting that civil parental liability statutes do not typically
bar additional liability in tort). Professor Andrews notes that although parents may be liable
in tort actions, recovery has been limited under common law standards in which the parent
owes a duty of care only to the foreseeable victim and in which the parents' conduct must be
the proximate cause of the victim's injury. Id. at 389-93. Parents who demonstrate their
ignorance of the child's propensity for the type of act which caused the victim's loss or
injury will not be held liable in tort for mere lack of supervision. Id.
163 Andrews, supra note 162, at 397, 402.
164 Id. at 399, 402.
165 See MAUER & CHESNEY-LIND, supra note 159.
166 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572 (2005) ($5000 cap); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10
§ 3922 ($5,000 cap); ILL. COMP. STAT. § 740.115 (1993) ($2500 cap for each act); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 85G (2000) ($5,000 cap); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-538.1 (West
1999) ($2000 cap); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39 (1943) ($1000 cap).
167 See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.1 (West 1998) ($25,000 cap for either injury, death or prop-
erty damage); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon 1999) (up to $25,000 plus court
costs and attorney's fees per act).
168 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-3 (1999) (no stated limit); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. Art.
2318 (1997) (no stated limit); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-15 (West 1937) (no stated limit);
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAWS § 3-112 (2005) (no stated limit); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-801
(Michie 1988) (no limits on property damage).
169 Andrews, supra note 162, at 404 (favoring increased civil parental liability but acknowl-
edging theoretical concerns associated with increased liability for parents).
170 See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 115/2 (1993) (liability for torts of unemancipated
minors); MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 231, § 85G (2000) (liability for willful tort of unemancipated
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sions that limit liability to those cases in which the child engages in willful or
malicious behavior' 7 1 may also affect the parents' judgment and advice about
how the child should proceed in the juvenile case. A parent, for example, may
encourage the child to reject a clearly advantageous plea offer in family court
to prevent the child from admitting responsibility for any act that may expose
the parents to civil liability.
Attorneys who represent children in juvenile court must be cognizant of
the growing potential for legal conflict between children and their parents.
Conflicting legal interests not only affect the reliability of parental advice, but
may also limit direct communication between the child's lawyer and the child's
parents and may hinder the lawyer's efforts to win the parents' support for the
child's objectives in the juvenile case.
5. Parents as Witness Against the Child
Normative preferences for open communication between children and
their parents are compromised by the absence of evidentiary privileges that
shield intra-familial communications from the court. Although court rules and
statutes explicitly protect confidential communication between the attorney and
the child, few provisions address the parameters of confidentiality between
children and parents or between attorneys and the parents of a minor client.
Absent these protections, the government may call the parent as a witness
against the child in juvenile proceedings; and the child's attorney may use the
confidences of the parent to advance the interests of the child. In this section, I
will look, first, at the scope and limitations of existing parent-child privileges
and, second, at the limitations of common attorney-client privileges when a
minor child is involved.
a. Absence of Parent-Child Privilege
Today, very few states have formally recognized a privilege in the confi-
dential communication between parents and their children. Only three states
have enacted statutory parent-child privileges, and only one state has clearly
recognized such a privilege at common law.' 72 Other states have remained
silent on the issue or have declined to establish a privilege in some fact-specific
context. 173
minors); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39 (1943) (parental responsibility for child's tort when
child lives with them causes damages).
171 See MAUER & CHESNEY-LIND, supra note 159.
172 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-138a (2003) (parent may elect or refuse to testify for or against
the accused child); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203(7) (2003) (with some exceptions parent or
legal custodian shall not be forced to disclose any communication made by their minor child
to them concerning matters in any civil or criminal action to which child is a party); MINN.
STAT. § 595.02(j) (2003) (with some exceptions communications made in confidence by the
minor to the minor's parents are protected); In re Mark G., 410 N.Y.S.2d 464-65 (1978); In
re A. & M., 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978).
173 See Ross, supra note 56, at 91, 93-99. Professor Ross discusses a collection of federal
and state cases in which the court declined to establish a parent-child privilege, but argues
that the narrow context in which the child shares confidential information with the parent has
rarely been presented to the court.
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The absence of a parent-child privilege may impede family-focused juve-
nile justice interventions that are rooted in open intra-familial communication.
Children who fear that their parents will be forced to report criminal conduct to
a probation officer or judge will be reluctant to seek the parents' help when
they find themselves in trouble with peers, drugs, or a probation violation. The
absence of a privilege may also hinder the development of trust between the
lawyer, the client, and the client's family. Although evidence suggests that
parents are actually rarely called as a witness against their children in court,' 7 4
the theoretical risk that a parent may be called generally requires the lawyer to
address it with both the parent and the child. 175 In addition, parents are fre-
quently interviewed by police officers and prosecutors in the investigation of
criminal cases; parents are almost always interviewed by probation officers,
psychologists, and psychiatrists in the preparation of juvenile diagnostic assess-
ments; and parents can and have been subpoenaed as witnesses against the
child in juvenile and criminal proceedings. Considering the risk, that confiden-
tial case information may be disclosed, intentionally or unwittingly, by the par-
ent, lawyers may be obligated to advise the child not to discuss the facts and
circumstances of an arrest or charge with the parent. Such legal advice is likely
to create tension between the lawyer and the parent who resents the lawyer's
interference in the parent-child relationship and may create confusion for the
child whose loyalty and trust are torn between his parent and the lawyer.
b. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege by Third-Party Presence
Communication among the attorney, child, and parents may be limited by
the failure of state statutes to extend explicitly the attorney-client privilege to
include attorney-child communications made in the presence of the child's par-
ents. Traditional interpretations of the attorney-client privilege suggest that the
presence of a third party during attorney-client communications will waive con-
fidentiality. 176 Thus, an attorney or child who invites the parent to participate
in interviews and consultation may compromise the child's legal interests,
including the child's privilege against self-incrimination. However, recent
revisions to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct suggest that the attorney-
client privilege should not be waived when a client of diminished capacity,
such as a minor, invites a family member or guardian to assist the client or
facilitate communication with the attorney. ' In addition, generic language in
statutes that codify the attorney-client privilege will often extend the privilege
to third parties who are "necessary to further the interests of the client" or
174 Ross, supra note 56, at 86.
17' Although parents are rarely called as a witness against the child in the District of Colum-
bia, it is not unheard of. As a result, it is regular practice among many juvenile defenders in
the District of Columbia to advise the child that conversations with the parent are not pro-
tected. See also Ross, supra note 56, at 102 (citing EDWARD HUMES, No MATrER How
LOUD I SHOUT: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF JUVENILE COURT 211 (1996)).
176 See, e.g., State v. Shire, 850 S.W.2d 923 (Mo. 1993) (presence of defendant's daughter
in interview with lawyer waived the attorney-client privilege); People v. Doss, 514 N.E.2d
502 (I11. 1987) (presence of third party who was only present to offer moral support waives
privilege).
177 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 3 (2002), available at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule I 14.html.
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"reasonably necessary for communication with a lawyer." 17 8 It is not clear,
however, whether inclusion of parents in the attorney-client privilege under
these statutes or the Model Rules would be limited to very young or cognitively
disabled children who are not able to communicate or make decisions for
themselves.
In common law, while a few courts have found that the parents' presence
will not waive the attorney-client privilege when the child looks to the parent as
an advisor and clearly intends the communications to remain confidential,1 79
not every court has accepted the parent-as-agent view in the attorney-child rela-
tionship. There is certainly no indication in the common law that a parent will
be a de facto natural guardian for the child in the attorney-client context.1 80 In
cases where the privilege was preserved with the parent, the courts were less
concerned with the age and capacity of the child and more concerned with the
intent of the parties involved. 8 '
In 1997, the legislature in the state of Washington approved a statute that
explicitly prohibits the examination of any parent about communications over-
heard between an attorney and the child arrested on a criminal charge. 82
There appears to be no other state that addresses this issue with such clarity. In
most jurisdictions, legislatures have not explicitly addressed the application of
privileges to attorney-parent communications or to attorney-client communica-
tions when parents are present in the interview. Where the attorney-client priv-
ilege does not clearly extend to parents, the lawyer may be forced to exclude
parents from attorney-client meetings and limit attorney-parent and parent-child
communications to an explanation of basic legal issues, a description of the
juvenile court process, and an exploration of disposition alternatives. Ulti-
mately, the absence of a parent-child privilege and the lack of clarity regarding
extension of the attorney-client privilege may limit the parent's involvement in
the development of legal strategies in the juvenile case.
6. An Opportunity for Collaboration
Notions of "good" legal advice certainly vary according to subjective
interpretation. Thus, it is unlikely that any two lawyers, and even less likely
that parents and lawyers, will always agree on what is "good" for the children
they represent. Nonetheless, if we consider ethical mandates that establish
minimum standards for the advice of counsel, we should all agree that compe-
tent legal advice is well informed, unbiased, and free of personal, emotional,
178 See, e.g., ARK. R. EVID. § 502(c) (2005); CAL. EVID. R. § 503(c) (1995); DEL. R. EVID.
§ 502(c) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1941); NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-503 (1995); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 502 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 503 (LexisNexis 2005).
179 For a representative sample of state and federal cases, see State v. Sucharew, 66 P.3d 16
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (noting privilege is generally waived when a third party is present, but
finding that parents presence did not waive privilege in that case); see also Kevlik v. Gold-
stein, 724 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Bigos, 45 F.2d 639 (1st Cir. 1972).
180 Ross, supra note 56, at 109; see also Deasy-Leas v. Leas, 693 N.E.2d 90, 94-95 (Ind.
1998) (discussing rejection of notion that privilege may exist upon "natural law" of parent-
child relationship).
181 See supra note 179.
182 WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(2)(b) (1961).
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and financial conflict.' 8 3 By analogy, ethical guidelines imposed on lawyers
provide useful and interesting insight into the problem of parental advice.
Parental advice to children in the juvenile justice system is often complicated
by the parents' desire to serve the best interests of the child, conflicting loyal-
ties to other members of the family, personal embarrassment, stress, psycholog-
ical trauma, and exposure to financial and penal liability. Under these
circumstances, it is probably unwise for children to rely solely on the wisdom
of parents in the resolution of important decisions in a juvenile case.
At the same time, it is probably unwise for children to rely solely on the
advice and wisdom of an attorney who has limited insight into the religious,
cultural, political, familial, and ethnic interests of the child. Like their parents,
children in juvenile court often struggle with their own conflicting loyalties and
competing legal and personal interests. An accused child, for example, may be
tom between protecting his own liberty interests and preserving the financial
interests of family members who may be affected by the outcome of the juve-
nile case. The child may also have difficulty exercising newly identified legal
rights and independence in juvenile court, especially when the assertion of
those rights and independence may engender the hostility of his parents and
challenge the child's sense of identity and belonging within the family.
Given the complexities of the decision-making process for children in the
juvenile justice system, neither the isolated advice of the lawyer nor of the
parent is likely to suffice. Thus, as discussed in the next Part, an effective
lawyer will often seek to improve the child's decision-making capacity by
encouraging the child to collaborate with others, such as parents, counselors,
and teachers, who can offer a perspective the lawyer may not share. By collab-
orating with parents, the child and his lawyer are likely to make more well-
informed choices in the juvenile case. Part II explores ways in which the attor-
ney, the child, and the child's parents may effectively collaborate without com-
promising the child's right to independent legal representation.
II. PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS: EFFECTIVE LAWYERING STRATEGIES
Establishing an appropriate relationship with parents is one of the most
difficult tasks the child's lawyer will face. In the juvenile justice system, law-
yers must accommodate a myriad of competing public policy, ethical, legal,
strategic, and psychosocial considerations. While theories of adolescent devel-
opment and normative preferences for healthy parent-child communication sug-
gest that parents will and should be involved in the child's decision-making
process, principles of constitutional law and the psychology of procedural jus-
tice indicate that autonomy and voice are essential features of justice and inte-
gral to the child's rehabilitative success. Similarly, while effective
collaboration between parents, children, and their lawyers may be useful, and
sometimes even necessary, to secure strategic advantage in court, full coopera-
183 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002) (requiring lawyer to provide straight-
forward advice); id. at R. 1.1 (defining competent representation to require legal knowledge,
thoroughness and preparation); id. at R. 1.7 (noting that lawyer shall not represent a client if
there is significant risk that representation will be limited by the lawyer's responsibility to a
third-party); id. at R. 1.8 (instructing lawyer to avoid financial conflict with a client).
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tion between the parties is often limited by conflicting legal interests and rules
that do not adequately protect confidential communication.
In this Part, I offer six preliminary recommendations to guide lawyers in
deciding when and how parents should participate in the attorney-child consul-
tation or otherwise collaborate in the child's decision-making process. As an
initial recommendation, I join the Fordham Conference scholars' commitment
to the individual legal rights of children and endorse a client-directed model of
advocacy for children in delinquency cases. In the second section, I explore
ways in which the lawyer may help the child negotiate appropriate boundaries
for parents in the attorney-client consultation. In the third section, I encourage
lawyers to manage the expectations of parents by clearly identifying the child
as the client and educating parents on the rights of the child and the obligations
of the child's lawyer. In the fourth section, I offer suggestions for how the
lawyer may empower parents to be better advisors for children in juvenile
court. In the fifth section, I acknowledge the importance of intra-family loyalty
and affiliation and encourage lawyers to respect, and ultimately defer to, the
parent-child affiliation after full consultation with both the child and his par-
ents. In the sixth section, I recognize that none of the foregoing strategies may
be appropriate when the child is incompetent to engage the lawyer in a reasona-
ble analysis of competing alternatives or fairly identify and communicate his
own objectives in the case. Thus, as a final recommendation, I offer guidelines
for evaluating the competency of the child, raising competency in court, and
consulting with parents of an incompetent child. Because the following recom-
mendations can only begin to address the complexities of the attorney-child-
parent triad, Part III will consider systemic reforms that may further enhance
effective collaboration.
A. Affirming the Child's Right to Independent Legal Counsel
In 1979 and 1980, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion and the American Bar Association, respectively, published Juvenile Justice
Standards that instruct children's counsel to provide zealous advocacy as
directed by the child at all stages of the delinquency case.' 84 Since then,
numerous scholars, including those at the 1996 Fordham Conference, have
endorsed a traditional, client-directed model of advocacy on behalf of the
accused juvenile.185 Client-directed advocacy has been recognized as the pri-
mary means by which an accused child may exercise or waive personal consti-
tutional rights such as the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the
right to proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to be free from
'84 See STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVEN-
TION (1979); LEE TEITELBAUM, STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES IN
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS ANNOTATED 69, 3.1(a) at 75, 9.4(a) at 90 (Robert Shepherd,
Jr. ed., 1996) (In 1971, the Juvenile Justice Standards Project was initiated at the Institute of
Judicial Administration. The standards were first published as a tentative draft in 1975 and
1976, and final revised drafts were published in 1980.).
185 See supra note 7.
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self-incrimination. 86 Client-directed advocacy is also mandated by standards
of professional conduct that grant clients authority to establish the objectives of
their case and require lawyers to maintain a normal relationship with children
as far as reasonably possible.' 87 These principles remain as true today as they
were in 1996 and must provide an overarching framework for any discussion of
an appropriate paradigm for interactions among the attorney, the child, and the
child's parents.
To preserve and explain principles of client-directed advocacy, the first
substantive meeting between the attorney and the child should be conducted in
private, without the parent. Even if initial introductions and perfunctory expla-
nations are made by or with a parent, the lawyer needs time and space to estab-
lish the lawyer's role as advocate for the child, separate and distinct from the
family. In initial meetings, the lawyer should help the child understand his
rights, both as a client and as a respondent in juvenile court. The lawyer may
engage the child in a discussion about the right to counsel, the meaning and
scope of the attorney-client privilege, the lawyer's duty to provide candid and
well-informed advice, the child's right to loyal, independent legal representa-
tion, and the child's right to make key decisions and define the objectives of his
case. Notwithstanding common cognitive and psychosocial limitations among
children and adolescents, the lawyer should presume, unless and until evidence
is provided to the contrary, that the child can and will understand relevant legal
issues and have an opinion about how the lawyer should proceed on the child's
behalf.'88 The lawyer should also make every effort to overcome difficulties in
the child's comprehension by speaking in age-appropriate language, providing
relevant examples, repeating key concepts over time, and creating a safe and
comfortable environment for the child to ask questions and express
concerns' 89
In the decision-making process, the child will control the final decision,
but the lawyer should offer advice and structure counseling in a way that is
likely to foster good decisions by the child.' 90 The lawyer should help the
child develop a list of alternatives at each stage of the case, engage the child in
186 Guggenheim, supra note 7, at 81, 86-87 (arguing that child's constitutional rights would
be meaningless if the attorney were allowed to assert and waive those rights in his own
discretion); Susan D. Hawkins, Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in
Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2076 (1996) (arguing
that control over the decision-making process lies at the heart of the American legal system
when personal legal rights are at stake); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Chil-
dren, 27 FAM. L. Q. 349, 353 (1993) (arguing that our emphasis on individual rights and
personal autonomy are furthered by the role of an attorney which enables litigants to pursue
and protect their legal rights).
187 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2002) (client objectives); id. at R. 1.14.
188 Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering
for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505, 1564 (1996) (dis-
cussing competency default in the representation of children in the child protective context).
189 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 152-53; Dinerstein, supra note 65, at 556; Wallace J.
Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1873, 1898 (1996).
190 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 6, 110; see also Robert F. Cochran et al., Sympo-
sium: Client Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 591, 598 (2003) ("The
client makes the ultimate decision, but the lawyer is actively involved in the process.").
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a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative, and help
the child clarify personal goals and objectives.' 91 Although the lawyer must
always support the child's final, lawful objectives, the lawyer's responsibility is
not just to passively or neutrally list alternatives, but to ensure that the child
will consider and evaluate all of the available options and choose the best alter-
native.192 To facilitate better decision-making by the child, the lawyer should
remain objective during the decision-making process and help the child realisti-
cally assess all of the legal and non-legal consequences of a contemplated
course of action. 193
In some cases, the lawyer may also fairly advise the child to consider and
pursue those options the lawyer believes to be in the child's best interest.' 94 In
the pretrial phase, for example, the lawyer may encourage the child to comply
with conditions of release, such as regular school attendance and abstinence
from drugs, not only because such compliance will improve the child's pros-
pect for a desirable disposition, but also because the lawyer believes that such
compliance will lead the child to a more productive future. Similarly, in the
disposition phase, the lawyer may encourage the child to agree to an out-of-
home placement that will remove him from his negative peer environment.
However, notwithstanding the lawyer's duty to provide the client with compre-
hensive, candid advice, the lawyer must always be cautious in rendering this
type of "best interest" advice to the child. First, the "best interest of the child"
is a difficult standard to assess and apply. Because the needs and interests of
children are so often intertwined with the interests of the child's family and
community, the child's lawyer may lack the cultural, ethnic, and psychological
insight he needs to adequately assess the best interest of the child.195 Second,
when the lawyer offers advice about both the best interest and the expressed
interest of the child, the lawyer may confuse the child and the child's parents
about the lawyer's role and responsibilities. Thus, even when the lawyer is
191 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 113; Dinerstein, supra note 65, at 525 (analogizing
collaborative lawyering to the medical doctrine of informed consent).
192 See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 131-32. The neutral investigative model of
advocacy has also been uniformly rejected by commentators in the juvenile defense commu-
nity. See, e.g., Mlyniec, supra note 7; Guggenheim, supra note 7, at 107-09.
193 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 135; Joseph Allegretti, Religious Values and Legal
Dilemmas in Bioethics: The Role of a Lawyer's Morals and Religion when Counseling Cli-
ents in Bioethics, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 9, 18-19 (2002).
194 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 132, 141 (in collaborative lawyering, the lawyer may
advise the client when the lawyer believes the client is making a bad decision); see also
Allegretti, supra note 193, at 18-19. In rendering candid advice, the lawyer "may refer not
only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors
that may be relevant to the client's situation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1
(2002).
195 See Andrew Hoffman, The Role of Child's Counsel in State Intervention Proceedings:
Toward a Rebuttable Presumption In Favor of Family Reunification, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J.
326, 336 (2004) ("The notion that attorneys can objectively conclude what serves a child's
best interests is preposterous. Attorneys are no more inherently objective than anyone
else."); Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-
Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 376-78 (1997) (arguing that clinical
student's unconscious racial bias affects the attorney client relationship); Peters, supra note
188, at 1566 (cautioning lawyers to avoid stereotypes and generalizations about children and
their background when assessing the best interest of the child).
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offering advice to advance the child's expressed legal interest, the child may
hear the lawyer's advice as that of a paternalistic, authoritarian adult, and not
that of a loyal advocate for the child. The parents may also begin to identify
the lawyer as an ally in their efforts to secure rehabilitation for the child and
forget the lawyer's duty to give voice to the expressed wishes of the child.
Ultimately, the lawyer must achieve a delicate balance between candid
advice and excessive paternalism or coercion. Rather than coercing the child
into treatment through paternalism, the lawyer may use a series of probing and
directed questions to help the child identify an array of realistic disposition
alternatives, lead the child through a reflection on his own strengths and needs,
and encourage the child to consider the likely response of the court, victims,
parents, and others impacted by the child's conduct.' 96 When the lawyer is not
overbearing, develops a healthy rapport with his client, and delays advice until
guilt is well established, the child retains individual autonomy and is free to
reject the lawyer's opinion. When the lawyer helps the child design his own
treatment plan, he also gives the child a meaningful and informed voice in the
process of justice and motivates the child to comply with the plan. 197
B. Negotiating the Parents' Role in the Attorney-Client Relationship
In early exchanges with the child, the lawyer must not only establish his
role as advocate, but should also evaluate the child's need and desire for con-
sultation outside of the attorney-client relationship.1 98 Because the collabora-
tive lawyer recognizes that effective decision-makers use all of the resources
available to them, the lawyer may encourage the child to identify other adults
who may provide additional information or offer an alternative perspective to
important issues in the case.' 9 9 Initial meetings conducted without parents give
the lawyer time to evaluate the child's dependence on family members for
advice, explore the child's fear of punishment or conflict with parents, and
evaluate the child's likely embarrassment or reluctance to provide an honest
account of facts when parents are consulted. Private meetings also provide the
child a safe space in which to consider his right to confidentiality and under-
stand the limits of parental control in the delinquency context. In jurisdictions
where communications between the child and the parent are privileged or
where the attorney-client privilege extends to parents of a minor child, the law-
yer should inform the child that he may invite parents to participate in attorney-
client interviews and consultations. In jurisdictions where there is uncertainty
about the parameters of the attorney-client and parent-child privileges, the law-
yer should advise the child not to discuss the facts underlying the delinquency
allegations with the parents, but may offer to speak to parents on the child's
196 See David Wexler, Problem Solving and Relapse Prevention in Juvenile Court, in JUDG-
ING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 197 (2003).
197 Ronner, supra note 58, at 112; Wexler, supra note 196, at 192-93.
198 Allegretti, supra note 193, at 17 (effective collaborative lawyering allows parties to
negotiate the terms of the relationship and allocate responsibility between them); Dinerstein,
supra note 65, at 524.
199 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 155 (attorney might direct the client by asking "Is
there anyone else that you would like to talk to about this choice?").
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behalf or encourage the child to talk generally with parents about legal options,
disposition alternatives, and general fears and concerns.
Often, the greatest service a lawyer can provide to any client is informa-
tion and choice. Unfortunately, lawyers frequently take their interaction with
parents for granted and deprive the child of choice by consulting with parents
without the child's consent, by withholding information about the child's right
to include or exclude parents from attorney-client interviews, or by failing to
educate the child about his right to direct his own legal representation. In an
effective client-centered or collaborative relationship, the lawyer should allow
the child to decide not only if a parent will be invited to participate, but also
when the parent will be invited and what information will be discussed when
the parent is present.
The decision about whether to include a parent in the attorney-client con-
sultation is not an easy one for the child. Together, the child and the lawyer
should carefully identify and evaluate all of the benefits and risks of parental
participation. Specifically, the lawyer and the child might consider factors such
as the child's ability to communicate with counsel and understand important
legal issues without the parents' assistance; the potential that parents will pro-
vide information or insight not otherwise available to the child or the advocate;
and the existence of unique cultural, ethnic, religious, or moral norms that are
shared between the parent and the child but not the lawyer. The lawyer might
also help the child consider strategic advantages that might be gained by
including parents in the attorney-client discussion, such as earning the parents'
support for the child's stated preference for in-home, community-based alterna-
tives to detention. In an effort to avoid selfish decision-making, the child might
also wish to seek the parents' opinion about the likely effect his choices will
have on the parents or other family members.
Ultimately, the lawyer should remain flexible to accommodate the needs
of individual children and their families. In families with children who regu-
larly look to parents for help, the child may wish to include parents for both
emotional support and substantive advice. In families with high emotional and
physical conflict, the child may fear the parents' wrath and ask the lawyer to
explain legal issues and factual details separately to the parent. In some cases,
the lawyer might conduct a series of early attorney-client meetings without par-
ents but then encourage the child to seek the parents' advice when the child
expresses concerns about what will be required of his parents at disposition or
begins to speak in terms of religious or familial norms. In other cases, when
the child is reticent and appears to distrust the lawyer, the attorney may include
parents in early, less-substantive interviews to build rapport but then exclude
parents from later fact-gathering sessions.
C. Managing the Expectations of Parents
When the child can and does elect to include parents in the attorney-client
interview, the child's lawyer does not relinquish the role of counselor and
advocate for the child and may not allow parents to usurp control over the
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child's legal representation.2" In the initial interaction with parents, the lawyer
must clearly identify the child as his client and advise the parent that the child
will be the ultimate arbiter of all key decisions, including those about whether
to plead guilty or have a trial. 20 ' The parents' presence also does not relieve
the attorney of the duty to explain the child's constitutional and statutory rights
within the juvenile justice system or of his obligation to help the child identify
and evaluate all available options in the case. Because the parents' advice is no
substitute for the lawyer's advice, the lawyer must still provide the child with a
candid opinion about how the child should proceed in the case.
The attorney-parent interaction often creates a considerable ethical
dilemma for the child's attorney, particularly when the parent is not represented
by counsel and looks to the child's attorney for advice.2 °2 Parents who are not
represented by counsel often mistakenly assume that the child's lawyer will
represent their interests along with the child's. Parents may expect the child's
lawyer to fight orders of restitution and oppose evaluations, drug testing, com-
munity service, and other rehabilitative programs ordered for the parent. Par-
ents may also look to the child's lawyer to defend their reputation and character
when attacked by probation officers, prosecutors, and judges. Similarly,
judges, prosecutors, and probation officers often expect the child's lawyer to
explain the meaning of parental participation orders to un-represented parents,
to encourage parents to attend counseling, community service, and drug testing
requirements, and to remind parents of the threat of contempt for failing to
participate in the child's treatment. The lawyer might even be in the awkward
position of seeking to collect attorney fees, court costs, and fines from the par-
ent whose interests he cannot protect.
In their dealings with parents, lawyers often deprive parents of meaningful
guidance by manipulating options, exaggerating negative consequences, with-
holding information about undesirable alternatives, or failing to correct the par-
ents' apparent misunderstanding about the roles of various players in the
system.203 In some cases, for example, parents who misunderstand the role of
the child's lawyer may turn to the lawyer for support and intervention with a
child who is violating conditions of pre-trial release or probation. In these
cases, the lawyer has little incentive to clarify his role or differentiate his obli-
gations from that of a probation officer. Instead, the lawyer may allow the
parent to vent and attempt to resolve intra-family disputes with the hope that
the parent will not call the probation officer and report the violation. In other
cases, the lawyer may win the parents' support for the child's placement on
probation without fully discussing the range of more restrictive alternatives or
fully disclosing the parents' responsibilities during the term of disposition. The
lawyer may also elicit information from and about parents without advising the
parent of how and when the information might be used. Some parents will be
surprised and hurt when lawyers use negative family information to the benefit
of the child and the detriment of the parents.
2o Henning, supra note 7, at 151-56 (providing detailed arguments against parent-directed
advocacy in which lawyer allows parents to control the child's legal representation).
201 Moore, supra note 112, at 1824-25, 1830.
202 Id. at 1826-27.
203 COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 11, 14-16, 137.
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If the lawyer is to remain within the bounds of relevant ethical obligations,
the lawyer should clearly disclose the limits of attorney-parent confidentiality
and remind the parent that the child's lawyer has not been appointed to
represent or protect the parents' interests.2 "4 The child's lawyer should also
remind the parent that he is obligated to represent the expressed wishes of the
child, even if those wishes are contrary to the legal and non-legal interests of
other family members. In some cases, with the child's consent, the lawyer may
inform parents that they have a right to speak directly to the judge about the
child's detention and treatment alternatives and may personally object to court
orders that directly effect them. The lawyer should not offer such information
if the child does not want the parent to speak in court or if the parent is likely to
take a position adverse to the client. Because parents are now integrally
involved in the juvenile justice system, the parent will generally be advised by
the judge, the prosecutor, or the probation officer that he or she has the right to
address the court.
When legal conflicts surface between the parent and the child, the lawyer
should explain rules of professional ethics that prohibit the lawyer-absent the
consent of both parties-from advising two individuals with conflicting inter-
ests.20 5 The lawyer's real dilemma often lies in his need to convince parents to
sacrifice their own interests to advance the needs and objectives of the child.
For example, the lawyer may need the parents to pay restitution and accept
responsibility for their child's conduct to improve the child's prospects of a
favorable disposition. In some cases, parents who clearly understand the role
of child's counsel and who voluntarily place the interests of the child above
their own will waive the right to conflict-free advice and knowingly follow the
guidance of the child's advocate in the juvenile case.
As recognized in Part I, not every case will lend itself to conflict between
the lawyer and the parents. In many cases, the lawyer will empathize with the
parents' feelings about peer pressure, popular culture, failing schools, and the
general difficulty of raising children in modern America. The child's lawyer
will also often have the difficult task of reassuring parents that they are not
entirely to blame for the child's involvement in juvenile court without conced-
ing the child's guilt or showing disloyalty to the child. In these cases, the
child's lawyer should be supportive and attentive to the emotional needs of the
parents without endorsing the parents' position or suggesting that he will
represent the parents' interests. Specifically, the lawyer may offer appropriate,
but noncommittal, acknowledgements that indicate interest and sympathy20 6
and, in some cases, recommend parent support groups or parent therapy.20 7
Finally, unless the parent is represented by counsel in the juvenile justice
system, 20 8 nothing in the rules of professional conduct prevent the lawyer from
interviewing and gathering information from the child's parent. In fact, the
204 Moore, supra note 112, at 1826-27, 1853-54 (recognizing that some attorney-parent
communication may be protected as client secrets when such disclosure is expressly prohib-
ited by the child or is detrimental to the interests of the child).
205 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
206 Winick, supra note 120, at 912.
207 Id. at 908-09.
208 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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child's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel may require the
attorney to engage in vigilant investigation on the child's behalf. 209 Parents are
not only an important source of information about the child, but they may also
be a conduit of information from prosecutors and probation officers who have
contacted the family. In addition, notwithstanding limits on the authority of
parents to direct counsel, children and their lawyers generally need parental
support to achieve case objectives and can rarely afford to alienate parents.
Thus, even when the parent may not attend attorney-client interviews, the law-
yer should be considerate of the parents' time when scheduling meetings with
the child, patiently and courteously respond to the parents' concerns about the
child and the case, and carefully explain principles of law and ethics that limit
parental involvement in the attorney-client relationship.
D. Empowering Parents to Be Better Advisors
Because children naturally look to parents for advice and may even value
the advice of parents over that of an unfamiliar lawyer, the lawyer serves his
client well by educating the parent on the law and practice of juvenile court.
While the lawyer should presume that parents have the capacity to understand
legal issues that are carefully explained to them, the lawyer should never
assume that parents have either an adequate prior knowledge of the juvenile
justice system or a fair appreciation of the risks and rights at stake for an
accused juvenile.2"' Thus, with consent of the child, the lawyer should make
every effort to educate parents on the realities of juvenile court. In pretrial
discussions, the lawyer should provide the parents with a realistic assessment of
the likelihood of success at trial and help the parents understand all of the legal
and non-legal consequences of a plea.21 1 At the disposition phase, the lawyer
may demystify the promise of treatment in juvenile court by exposing parents
to information about the dangers of incarceration and explaining the responsi-
bilities and powers of the probation officer, prosecutor, and judge.
Although legal conflicts are increasingly common between parents and
children in the modern juvenile court, the existence of a conflict will rarely
prevent the parents from advising the child on how to proceed in the juvenile
case. While the judge may prohibit the parent from waiving the child's consti-
tutional rights in court when a conflict is evident,2 12 neither the judge nor the
lawyer may preclude parents from advising or coercing children in the privacy
of their own homes. Nonetheless, by engaging and counseling the parents, the
lawyer may help the parents focus some attention away from their own legal
and personal concerns and begin to view their interests in conjunction with
those of the child. In some cases, the lawyer may convince the parents to with-
209 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
210 See supra notes 90, 91.
211 Jim Lewis, The Aftermath of the Lionel Tate Case: A Child and A Choice, 28 NOVA L.
REV. 479, 484 (Lionel Tate's trial lawyer recognizing the need for assistance from parents in
providing child with realistic view of likely outcomes in a criminal case).
212 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6337 (2005) ("[P]arent, guardian or custodian may not
waive counsel for a child when their interest may be in conflict with the interest or interests
of the child."); In re Manuel R., 543 A.2d 719 (Conn. 1988) (parent may not waive child's
constitutional right to counsel when parent has interests that conflict with that of the child).
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hold or delay advice that is motivated by the parents' self-interest and urge the
parents to consult with preachers, friends, or relatives who are more objective,
less conflicted, and less emotionally invested in the outcome of the child's case.
When parents remain hostile towards the child's legal interests, the lawyer may
work to mend relationships within the family and help the child regain the
parents' support. When parents are angry, for example, about court fines and
missed hours at work, the lawyer may help the child develop a plan to pay
parents back, increase household chores, or take greater responsibility for the
care and supervision of younger siblings. The lawyer ultimately advances the
child's legal interests and improves the parents' role as advisor for the child by
attempting to ameliorate conflict within the family and educating the child's
parents about key decisions the child must make in the juvenile case.
E. Deferring to Parental Affiliation
Despite the lawyer's best efforts, children will sometimes make patently
bad legal decisions, motivated more by parental loyalty and affiliation than by
logic and reason. Lawyers face a difficult dilemma when parents, such as Lio-
nel Tate's mother, insist on, and the child agrees to, a course of action that most
lawyers would identify as unwise and harmful to the child. This concern
requires us to revisit the default paradigm for the role of child's counsel. That
is, absent articuable evidence that the child is incompetent to act in his own
interests, the lawyer is bound to pursue the client's lawful objectives, regardless
of whether the lawyer agrees or disagrees with the child's decision.2" 3 If the
child has identifiable values and goals, understands the consequences of his
choices, and can provide reasons for selecting among competing alternatives,
then the child is competent and capable of making decisions on his own
behalf. 1 4 Thus, when the child knowingly and intelligently decides to follow
the advice of a parent, the lawyer must honor that decision absent any evidence
that the parent has unduly coerced the child, such as through the promise of
reward or the threat of punishment.21 5 When there is evidence of coercion, the
lawyer must decide whether the child's deference to the influence of the parent
renders the child incompetent or of sufficiently diminished capacity to warrant
protective intervention by the lawyer.21 6
When the child relies heavily on the misguided advice of parents, the law-
yer should remind the child that he has the right to make his own decisions in
213 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUtCT R. 1.2 (2002); Peters, supra note 188 at 1565 (dis-
cussing "advocacy default").
214 See Daniel L. Bray & Michael D. Ensley, Dealing with the Mentally Incapacitated Cli-
ent: The Ethical Issues Facing the Attorney, 33 FAM. L.Q. 329, 336 (1999); David Luban,
Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454, 455-57; Nancy M. Mauer &
Patricia W. Johnson, Ethical Conflicts in Representing People with Questionable Capacity,
114 PLI/NY 1143, 1158 (January 2002) (stating that attorneys should "use a non-circular
method to assess capacity. It is not enough to consider whether the client's decisions are
unwise but rather whether the client can give specific reasons for specific decisions and
understand the consequences").
215 William A. Kell, Ties That Bind?: Children's Attorneys, Children's Agency, and the
Dilemma of Parental Affiliation, 29 Lov. U. CHi. L. J. 353, 358-60 (1998).
216 See Lewis, supra note 211 at 482 (Tate's trial lawyer acknowledging lawyer's responsi-
bility to make sure that client's decisions are voluntary and free from undue pressure).
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the juvenile case. The lawyer should also help the child explore the underlying
reasons for the deference to parents and then re-direct the child's attention to
the strengths and weakness of each contemplated course of action. The lawyer
should not assume that parental influence, absent evidence of physical abuse or
extreme mental duress, renders the child's decision incompetent.21 7 In fact, the
child's respect for and ultimate adoption of the parents' views may reflect a
perfectly sound decision to defer to a seemingly wise, knowledgeable, and car-
ing adult. The child's voluntary deference to parents may also serve legitimate
societal norms such as familial intimacy and stability, selfless consideration of
others, and moral responsibility. 18 In discussions with the child, the lawyer
may find that the child's decisions are motivated by a well-considered and self-
less loyalty to parents, by moral or religious views that require the child to
admit fault and take responsibility for his own actions, or by a legitimate and
well-thought-out desire to avoid financial or other consequences for his par-
ents.219 The child, on the other hand, may discover after consultation with a
lawyer that his parents' advice is well-intentioned, but simply ill-informed.
In the Tate case, Lionel's mother was an army veteran, employed as a
police officer, who was very attentive to her son's case. Lionel's trial attorney
perceived her as intelligent, concerned, and fully committed to the best interest
of her child.2 20 The attorney also had no blatant or overt reason to suspect that
Ms. Grossett-Tate was physically or mentally abusive to her son. Thus-com-
petency issues aside for the moment 22 '-Lionel's lawyer was probably bound
to follow Lionel's decision to reject the plea offer even if that decision was
strongly influenced by poor parental judgment. Lionel Tate's case, of course,
cannot be studied without attention to issues of competency. As discussed
below, when the child is clearly incompetent to engage in the decision-making
process, the lawyer must necessarily deviate from the default paradigm and
determine whether the parent is an appropriate surrogate decision-maker for the
child.
F. Raising Competency and Taking Protective Measures
The advocacy default, and the preference for a normal attorney-client rela-
tionship, assumes that the child, when properly advised, will have the capacity
to make important decisions in the case.222 When the child lacks such capacity,
an alternative paradigm will be warranted. Consistent with the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, the lawyer may deviate from the normal attorney-client
relationship if the lawyer reasonably believes "that the client is at risk of sub-
stantial physical, financial, or other harm unless action is taken," and that a
normal attorney-client relationship cannot be maintained because the client
27 Kell, supra note 215 at 376. When there is evidence of abuse and the client lacks the
capacity to make reasoned decisions on his own behalf, the lawyer may consider appropriate
protective measures. Id. at 373-74; see also notes 215-28 and accompanying text.
218 Kell, supra note 215 at 361, 367, 369-70.
219 See id. at 356.
220 Lewis, supra note 211, at 479.
221 State v. Tate, 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2003) (reversing conviction for trial court's failure to
order pre-trial or post-trial competency evaluation for Tate); see also infra notes 238-43.
222 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 1 (2002).
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"lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered
decisions in connection with the representation."2" 3 In determining whether the
child is capable of understanding legal issues and acting in his own interests,
the lawyer should look for independent evidence outside of the attorney-client
relationship. 24 The lawyer might interview teachers, counselors, and others
with knowledge about the child and may consider psychological, psychiatric,
and educational records that evaluate the child's cognitive and psychosocial
capacities.225 While the lawyer might also interview parents in the evaluation
of the child's decision-making capacity, the lawyer should remain acutely
aware that legal conflicts and emotional tensions within the family may cloud
the parents' judgment about the child's capacity to make decisions on his own
behalf.
In the delinquency context, a child who is so cognitively limited that he
cannot communicate with counsel or make reasoned decisions for himself may
not be competent to stand trial. In Dusky v. United States, the Supreme Court
outlined a two-part legal standard for determining whether a defendant is com-
petent or incompetent to proceed in a criminal case. 26 The accused will be
competent only if he has "a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him" and a "sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. 2 27 The same com-
petency standard has been applied on behalf of juveniles in many states. 228 In
Lionel's case, there was ample evidence-independent of either the attorney-
client or the parent-child relationships-that Lionel was incompetent to pro-
ceed.229 Specifically, at trial, a neuropsychologist testified that Lionel, who
was thirteen years old at the time of his criminal trial, had a mental delay of
about three to four years, making him the age equivalent of nine or ten years
old.230 A child psychologist testified that Lionel had the social maturity of a
six-year old and delays in inferential thinking. 3 Other evidence indicated that
Lionel had an IQ of ninety or ninety-one, placing him in the lowest twenty-five
percent of all test-takers his age.232 In addition, Lionel's appellate lawyer
reported at a later hearing that Lionel was drawing pictures, not listening to the
court proceedings, not communicating with counsel, and generally did not
know what was going on.2 33 The Court of Appeals in Florida, ultimately held
that pre-trial and post-trial evidence regarding Lionel's competence warranted
reversal of the conviction and remand for a new trial.2 3
223 Id. at R. 1.14 cmt. 5.
224 Kell, supra note 216, at 371; Peters, supra note 188, at 1564.
225 Kell, supra note 216, at 371-72; Peters, supra note 188, at 1508.
226 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
227 Id. at 402.
228 See, e.g., Golden v. State, 21 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Ark. 2000); In re Carey, 615 N.W.2d
742, 746-47 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); In re Williams, 687 N.E.2d 507, 510 (Ohio Ct. App.
1997); In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d 810, 811 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); In re W.A.F., 573 A.2d 1264,
1267 (D.C. App. 1990).
229 See State v. Tate, 864 So. 2d 44, 48-51 (Fla. 2003).
230 Id. at 48.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 50.
233 Id. at 48.
234 Id. at 50-51.
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Competency issues are rarely as clear as they appeared to the appellate
court in Lionel's case. 235 Thus, the decision to raise competency in juvenile
court is often a very complicated one for the child's advocate.236 In deciding
whether to raise competency, the child's lawyer should recognize that decision-
making capacity, especially when children and adolescents are involved, is an
ever-evolving skill that varies and improves with context, experience, and
instruction. 23 7 There is certainly no definitive age at which all children will be
able to consult with counsel and become competent to stand trial in a juvenile
case. As commentary to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct reminds us,
even a child as young as five or six and certainly those of ten or twelve will
often have the ability "to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions
about matters affecting" his own well-being. '23 8 The Model Rules also urge
attorneys to intrude on the client's decision-making to the least extent possible
even when the client is of a diminished capacity.2 39 Thus, before raising com-
petency, the lawyer should make every effort to maximize the child's capacities
by communicating with the child in age-appropriate language, using accessible
analogies and examples, and potentially seeking the assistance of others who
can better engage the child at his cognitive capacity.2 40 The lawyer should also
make every effort to ensure that his own concerns about the child's competency
235 In fact, at the trial phase, neither the lawyer nor the judge raised Lionel's competency to
stand trial. Id. at 48. In addition, expert witnesses for the government testified at the post-
trial competency hearing that they believed that Lionel was competent to stand trial. Id. at
49.
236 The decision is complicated not only by the difficulty of assessing the competency of
children, but also by the practical implications of raising competency in a criminal context.
In some cases, for example, a child who is found incompetent to stand trial in juvenile court,
may be subject to more onerous restrictions in a civil commitment than would otherwise be
warranted at sentencing in juvenile court. See Lynda E. Frost & Adrienne E. Volenick, The
Ethical Perils of Representing the Juvenile Defendants Who May Be Incompetent, 14 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 327, 349-50 (2004) (suggesting that consequences of being found incompe-
tent must be weighed against delinquency adjudication including commitment to a juvenile
justice agency).
237 Evidence suggests that decision-making is predicated on the lawyer's ability to create an
appropriate environmental context for counseling and to develop a good relationship with the
client. Children, for example, appear to demonstrate better cognitive capacity in contexts
that are familiar to them and devoid of stress. See Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental
Barriers to the Empowerment of Child Clients, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 895, 918-19 (1999);
Grisso, supra note 52, at 16-18. Research also suggests that certain psychosocial aspects of
adolescent decision-making-such as trust for adults, risk perception and risk preference-
are likely to improve as the attorney-client relationship improves. Schmidt et al., supra note
7, at 178. For additional discussion, see also Kell, supra note 215, at 374 (arguing that
children can practice and enhance newly acquired decision-making skills with the effective
assistance of counsel); cf COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 8-9 (noting that lawyers
acquire good decision-making through "innate ability, habit, age, knowledge, breadth of
experience, education and character").
238 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 1 (2002).
239 Id. at R. 1.14 cmt. 3, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel 14.html (track-
ing Ethics 2000 revisions).
240 Id. at R. 1.14 cmt. 5; Peters, supra note 188, at 1565 (urging a lawyer to continue
communicating with the client at the level of sophistication of which the client is capable).
The lawyer must also continue to treat the child with attention and respect, make every effort
to communicate with the child, and intrude on the child's decision-making autonomy to the
least extent possible. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmts. 2, 5 (2002).
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are not motivated, consciously or subconsciously, by the lawyer's belief that
the child is making a wrong decision in the case.
When the child's capacity and competence are clearly at issue, the Model
Rules allow the lawyer to employ a range of alternatives to assess and protect
the client's interests. Specifically, the lawyer may consult with family mem-
bers who have the ability to protect the child's interests, seek assistance from
other professionals, allow time for the child's circumstances to improve, or
request appointment of a guardian ad litem.24 ' Consistent with the Rules' pref-
erence for the least restrictive intervention, commentary to the Rules note that
the lawyer should refrain from the "extreme measure" of seeking appointment
of a guardian ad litem unless and until other less restrictive measures have
failed.2 42
As recognized in Part I, in many cases, the child's parent will be a natural
ally or consultant for the child and his lawyer as the child attempts to under-
stand important legal concepts and make key decisions in the case. Yet, when
the lawyer and the child merely seek to consult with the parent, the lawyer
should look first to the child, and not to family members, to make decisions on
the child's behalf.243 On the other hand, when the child's capacity is so dimin-
ished that he cannot communicate with his lawyer or make decisions on his
own behalf, the Model Rules suggest that the lawyer may actually look to the
child's family to protect the child's interest and, presumably, make decisions
on the child's behalf. Thus, when the child's competence is in question in a
juvenile case, the lawyer may look to the child's parents to help make key
decisions including whether and when to raise competency to the judge.
Reliance on parents, however, to make decisions for an incompetent chil-
dren is not without limits. Commentary to the Rules explicitly states that "In
matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parent as a
natural guardian may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the
lawyer is representing the child."' 4 Legislative developments in the modem
juvenile justice system clearly limit the extent to which lawyers can and should
look to parents as surrogate decision-makers for the child. The lawyer should
not defer to parents when the parents' legal, financial, and other interests con-
flict with those of the child, when the parents are not competent to decide them-
selves, or when the parents' psycho emotional issues limit the parents'
objectivity in evaluating the child's options.24 5 Moreover, in the juvenile and
criminal justice systems, the lawyer may have an ethical or legal duty to take
certain actions, such as challenging the child's competency to stand trial, even
if the parent disagrees.
Without knowing more about Ms. Gossett-Tate and her relationship to
Lionel, it is not clear how much Lionel's lawyer should have deferred to his
mother and what role Lionel's mother should have had in speaking for her son
in the criminal case. What is clear, however, at least according to the Court of
Appeals in Florida, is that Lionel's competence was sufficiently in doubt to
241 Id. at R. 1.14 cmt. 5.
242 Id. at R. 1.14 cmts. 5, 7.
243 Id. at R. 1.14 cmt. 3.
244 Id. at R. 1.14 cmt. 4.
245 See supra discussion in Part I.B.
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permit his lawyer to deviate from the normal attorney-client paradigm. Lio-
nel's trial lawyer could have-and probably should have-raised competency
even without Lionel's consent or his mother's.
III. SYSTEMIC REFORM
Given the complexities of modem parental accountability measures which
often create conflict between parents and children strategies for effective lawy-
ering will be only partly useful in facilitating effective collaboration among
attorneys, children, and their parents. In this Part, I explore systemic reforms
that may reduce the potential for conflict without compromising public safety,
absolving parents of responsibility for the conduct of their children, or exclud-
ing parents from the rehabilitative process. First, I encourage policymakers to
develop a more centralized approach to parental accountability. Specifically, I
propose that parental accountability for the delinquent behavior of children be
managed primarily within the juvenile justice system and largely removed from
criminal and civil courts. Second, I encourage legislators to create or expand
existing measures to protect the confidential communication between children
and their parents. To this end, I urge legislators to adopt a narrow parent-child
privilege that would shield confidential communication from the child to the
parent and that would allow the parent to elect or refuse to testify when the
parent observes illegal conduct by the child. I also encourage states to explic-
itly extend the attorney-client privilege to include parents of a minor child.
A. Restructuring Parental Accountability Measures within Juvenile, Civil,
and Criminal Courts
Criminal parental liability, civil parental liability, and family-focused
juvenile justice reforms all share a common agenda-encouraging parents to
take greater responsibility for the conduct of their children and reducing juve-
nile crime. Unfortunately, the uncoordinated and conflicting methodologies
within each strategy threaten to undermine both objectives. Compare, for
example, the pervasive family-focused reforms in the juvenile justice system
with the punitive agenda of the adult criminal court. While the juvenile court
seeks to improve communication and reduce conflict within the family, the
criminal court adds a layer of conflict and offers little, if any, counseling or
mediation for the family. Likewise, while family-focused juvenile models are
designed to keep children in the home and engage parents in the rehabilitation
of their children, exorbitant civil and criminal penalties create a perverse incen-
tive for parents to relinquish responsibility for the care and supervision of their
children.
1. Coordinating Parental Accountability and Victims' Compensation in
Juvenile Court
Given recent legislative reforms, juvenile courts, alone, now provide
ample opportunity to hold parents accountable for the acts of their children. As
discussed in Part II, parents are now involved in every aspect of the juvenile
justice system. Current legislation subjects parents to the jurisdiction of the
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court and requires parents to participate in counseling, parenting-skills classes,
and other rehabilitative programs for themselves and their children.2 46 Family-
focused juvenile justice programs also seek to build supportive parent-child
relationships, teach positive discipline methods, and encourage more active
parental monitoring and supervision. In a more retributive vein, juvenile stat-
utes also require parents to pay attorneys' fees, court costs, fines, and restitu-
tion.2 47 Parents who fail to comply with such orders may be held in contempt
and incarcerated.24 8 Ultimately, juvenile courts not only hold the parents
accountable, but they also provide comprehensive therapeutic interventions to
correct intra-family problems and reduce juvenile crime.
Modem juvenile courts also provide a comprehensive response to the vic-
tims' needs. Victims are increasingly involved in juvenile proceedings through
restorative justice programs, victim-offender mediation, and new victims'
rights legislation that allows victims to attend juvenile hearings, submit victim
impact statements, and recover monetary compensation for personal injury,
property damage, and lost wages at work.249 Recognizing that parents are at
least partly responsible for the conduct of their children, juvenile statutes hold
parents jointly or severally liable for the victim's compensation.2 5 °
Resolution of disputes between the victim and the parent in juvenile court
may have policy advantages over the resolution of those disputes in other fora.
Most significantly, juvenile courts, which routinely engage in a comprehensive
assessment of relationships within the family and are required to determine the
child's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, may be better equipped to resolve
issues of fault and causation in tort law and evaluate the maliciousness and
willfulness of the child's conduct as required in civil strict liability statutes. If
the child is found not guilty, or if significant mitigating circumstances at trial
suggest that the child's conduct was not intentional or malicious, it would be
inappropriate to hold parents responsible for damages under the civil statute. It
might be appropriate, however, to hold the parent responsible in tort theory if
the family assessment revealed a history of inadequate supervision by the par-
ent or documented the parents' failure to respond to prior acts of violence and
destruction by their children. Although any parental accountability measure is
likely to create conflict between the parent and the child, a more coordinated
approach may reduce the overall negative impact on efforts to stabilize families
and rehabilitate children. When parents are satisfied with the accuracy of the
fact-finding process and are convinced that equitable outcomes have been
reached between the victim and the parents, the parents may be less hostile to
246 See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
249 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2317 (2004) (requiring court to consider victim impact state-
ment in deciding whether to dismiss a juvenile case); D.C. CODE § 16-2320 (2004) (requir-
ing court to consider victim impact statement in determining appropriate disposition for
child); D.C. CODE § 16-2320.01 (2004) (allowing court to enter a judgment of restitution for
victims to cover cost of damaged or stolen property, personal injury and/or counseling or
other mental health services); D.C. CODE § 16-2340 (2004)(detailing general rights of vic-
tims in juvenile court).
250 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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the court order and to the child. 251 Likewise, parents who are fully engaged in
the family-focused intervention may accept restitution, community service, and
other requirements as a joint venture of the family. At a minimum, coordinat-
ing parental accountability within the juvenile justice system allows the court to
structure a disposition plan that more appropriately allocates responsibility for
the child's conduct among the child, parent, and other systems that contribute
to the child's development. Coordinating efforts in the juvenile system also
ensures that parents, children, and their lawyers will be fully informed of the
breadth of potential parental liability and allows children to make decisions that
consider, and potentially accommodate, the interests of parents.
As one of many possible reforms, policymakers may amend civil parental
liability statutes to require victims of juvenile crime to pursue all available
recourse in pending juvenile justice proceedings before seeking damages in the
civil action.252 Tort actions and civil parental liability statutes might also be
limited to those cases in which the victims cannot be compensated because the
juvenile case was dismissed for reasons other than acquittal. Given the rise of
comprehensive Unified Family Courts, in which a single judge is given juris-
diction over all matters that involve the family,25 3 legislators might also con-
sider whether civil parental liability statutes fall appropriately within the
purview of family courts. By addressing victims' compensation in the juvenile
or Unified Family Court, policymakers would reduce the overall cost of civil
litigation and provide a more efficient forum for the just resolution of disputes
between parents and victims of juvenile crime.
2. Limiting Exposure to Criminal Liability
Policymakers should also consider whether and to what extent criminal
liability is necessary for parents. While criminal liability may be appropriate
for those parents who are co-conspirators in the crimes of their children, crimi-
nal liability may not be appropriate for those parents who are less directly
involved in the child's delinquent conduct. Because punitive sanctions are
arguably only warranted when parents can, but refuse to, control their chil-
254dren, juvenile courts are again probably better equipped than criminal courts
to determine whether the parent is simply unwilling to exercise appropriate
control and discipline or whether the parent has been unable to control the child
251 Ronner, supra note 58, at IIl (arguing that when individuals experience a legal proce-
dure that they feel is fair, they have more respect for the law and are more likely to accept
the outcome).
252 Cf D.C. CODE § 16.2320.01 (2004) (juvenile statute indicating that any civil verdict
shall be reduced by the amount paid under the judgment of restitution in the juvenile case).
253 Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in Fam-
ily Law: A Blueprint to Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 469 (1998)
(providing comprehensive list of possible areas of subject matter jurisdiction in UFCs);
James W. Bozzomo & Gregory Scolieri, A Survey of Unified Family Courts: An Assessment
of Different Jurisdictional Models, 42 FAM. CT. REv. 12, 15-16 (2004) (documenting survey
results of subject matter jurisdiction in unified family courts to include domestic violence,
divorce, abuse/neglect, civil commitment, juvenile delinquency, adult family criminal mat-
ters, elder abuse among many others).
254 McMullen, supra note 73, at 645-46, 654-55 (discussing injustice of punishing parents
when their good faith attempts at child discipline are unsuccessful).
Spring 2006]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
because of psychological or physical disabilities that affect either the child or
the parent. When diagnostic evaluations suggest that the child is unable to
conform his behavior to expected standards, despite the reasonable efforts of
parents, it would be inappropriate to hold the parents criminally responsible.
When parents simply refuse to engage in the care and supervision of the child,
the juvenile judge, unlike the criminal judge, generally has the power to remove
the child from the home.
Juvenile courts also generally have the resources and expertise to assist
those parents who are willing and able to engage in the rehabilitative process.
Criminal courts, on the other hand, often fail to consider whether criminal pen-
alties will impede parental efforts to comply with the therapeutic plan devel-
oped in juvenile court. Criminal courts rarely account for the impact of
parental incarceration on the delinquent child and his siblings and generally
remain inattentive to collateral consequences, such as loss of housing and
employment that will exacerbate, not improve, the child's conduct.255 Also,
unlike modem, multi-systemic responses to juvenile crime, criminal parental
liability statutes place disproportionate blame on parents and ignore societal
causes of delinquency such as poverty, racism, and poor education policy.
25 6
While criminal provisions focus entirely on the role of parents in the control of
their children, innovative juvenile courts build on empirical research that docu-
ments the multidimensional causes of delinquency and seek reform not only in
the family, but also in the child's school, neighborhood, community, and peer
set.
2 5 7
As a better response to all of the competing policy objectives, policymak-
ers should reevaluate current parental liability strategies with an eye toward
reforms that will coordinate parental accountability in one court, reduce expo-
sure to civil and criminal liability for parents, and equip parents with the skills
they need to be better parents.25 8 Although the proposed reforms may reduce
the number and alter the nature of parental liability statutes, the reforms should
not leave victims uncompensated or the community at any greater risk of harm.
255 See generally MAUER & CHESNEY-LIND, supra note 159 (collection of essays critiquing
criminal justice system's inattention to collateral consequences of criminal conviction).
256 Cahn, supra note 145, at 415; Gilbert et al., supra note 34, at 1156, 1169; McMullen,
supra note 73, at 640-41.
257 Gilbert et al., supra note 34, at 1169.
258 Although I advocate for a centralized parental accountability response within the juve-
nile justice system, I fear that some juvenile justice provisions, such as those that require
parents to reimburse the state for the cost of the child's court-ordered counseling, residential
treatment, and psychological or psychiatric evaluations may place disproportionate responsi-
bility on the parents and absolve the community at large of any role it may play in the
delinquency of minors. Even where local juvenile justice budgets are thin and programs are
limited, statistical correlations between poverty and juvenile crime suggest that parents will
not be able to afford the quality and individualized treatment their children may need. While
policymakers might legitimately require parents to obtain mental health resources through
private insurances, Medicare and other public assistance available to their children, other
out-of-pocket costs place a tremendous burden on parents and siblings of delinquent
children.
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B. Protecting Communication Between Lawyers, Children, and Their
Parents
Policymakers should consider reforms in the areas of attorney-client privi-
leges and confidential intra-familial communications. Reforms that clearly
extend the attorney-client privilege to parents of minor children and that recog-
nize a narrow privilege for communications made by children to their parents
will have low costs in the fair resolution of juvenile cases. Such reforms, how-
ever, would yield considerable gain in rehabilitating delinquent youth, building
capacity and cohesion in families, and improving the quality of relationships
between attorneys, children, and their parents.
1. Extending the Attorney-Client Privilege
Because very few states legislatures have explicitly addressed the role of
parents in the attorney-client relationship, courts are currently left to resolve
issues of privilege on a case-by-case basis. To alleviate uncertainty for the
attorney, the child, and the parent and to establish greater uniformity in the
application of the privilege to parents of a minor child, I propose that state
legislators make every effort to clarify the parameters and exceptions to the
attorney-client privilege when children are involved.
In our society, we have clearly recognized the importance of confidential
communication between lawyers and their clients.25 9 In criminal cases, the
attorney-client privilege has constitutional implications because it is necessary
to protect the defendant's concurrent rights to counsel and freedom from self-
incrimination.2 6 ° When third parties such as language translators, sign inter-
preters, expert witnesses, or even relatives are necessary to facilitate communi-
cation between the defendant and a lawyer, the privilege should extend not only
as a matter of logic, but also as a matter of constitutional necessity.26" ' While
most of us would readily agree that a Spanish-speaking defendant retains the
attorney-client privilege when he brings a translator to meet with an English
speaking lawyer, some of us might hesitate when asked whether an adolescent,
who is old enough to speak and reason, is equally entitled to the assistance of a
parent in the attorney-client interview.262 As explored in Part I, practice and
reason suggest that in some cases parents may be the only means by which a
child charged with a crime can secure or meaningfully exercise his constitu-
tional right to legal representation.2 63 Although the accused child is entitled to
traditional, client-directed advocacy in a delinquency case, the child may ini-
tially look to parents for help in understanding the role of counsel, building
trust in the attorney-child relationship, and articulating questions and concerns
to the lawyer. Privileged communication between the parent, the child, and the
lawyer may also provide the parents with information they need to effectively
259 Ross, supra note 56, at 106-07.
260 Ross, supra note 56, at 106.
261 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 3 (2002); Ross, supra note 56, at 106-
07, 86-87.
262 Cf. Missouri v. Fingers, 565 S.W.2d 579 (Mo. 1978) (young adult, age twenty-four,
waived attorney-client privilege when father was present when communicating with
attorney).
263 Ross, supra note 56, at 86.
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advise the child about case alternatives and help the lawyer gather information
he or she will need to provide the best advice to the client.264
To ensure attorney-client confidentiality for children in juvenile and crimi-
nal courts, states may follow the lead of Washington, which now prevents a
parent or a guardian of a minor child arrested on a criminal charge from being
examined as to a communication between the child and his or her attorney if
the communication was made in the presence of the parent or guardian.
2 65
Although the Washington statute does not provide a blanket parent-child privi-
lege, it does facilitate a more productive relationship among the attorney, the
child, and the parent by allowing the attorney and the child to communicate
without fear of waiving the child's confidences. Because the statute does not
create any right of participation for the parent, the attorney and the child retain
the power to exclude the parent from the consultation when necessary. Consid-
ering the need to preserve confidentiality and loyalty in the primary attorney-
client dyad, I do not endorse a general attorney-parent privilege that would
protect communications made by the child's parents to the lawyer outside of
the child's presence unless such communications are necessary to advance the
child's interests and are intended by the child to remain confidential. As indi-
cated above, the attorney should remind the parent that there are no privileged
communications between the parent and the attorney absent the child's consent.
Although any new or extended privilege may result in the exclusion of
relevant evidence, policymakers must balance the potential loss of evidence
against the benefits of the privilege. Extension of the attorney-client privilege
in this context would protect family cohesion, encourage the child to seek the
parent's advice when in trouble, and facilitate the parents' involvement in, and
commitment to, the child's rehabilitation. On the other hand, statutes like the
one proposed here would likely pose minimal danger to the fair administration
of justice. Anecdotal evidence and the paucity of appellate litigation on the
issue suggests that prosecutors are already reluctant to call parents as witnesses,
either because they fear that parents will be less truthful about the crimes of
their children or because they recognize the value of confidentiality in the par-
ent-child relationship.26 6 Legislatures should codify by statute that which is
implicit in practice.
2. Establishing a Parent-Child Privilege
Extending the attorney-client privilege to parents who attend or participate
in meetings between the child and the lawyer will provide only limited protec-
tion for the confidential communications of an accused child.267 Logic would
suggest that it is far more common for children to seek the advice of parents in
private conversations before an attorney is hired and after attorney-client meet-
ings. To preserve confidential communications by children who seek their par-
264 Id. at 107.
265 WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060 (2005).
266 Ross, supra note 56, at 99-100.
267 WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1)(b) (explicitly states that privileged communication
between the attorney, the child and the parent does not create also privilege communications
between the parent and the child before the child's arrest).
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ent's advice in the juvenile justice context, I propose that states adopt a narrow
parent-child privilege to govern these circumstances.
Parent-child communications readily satisfy standards and criteria estab-
lished for the recognition of a new privilege. Privileges are generally recog-
nized when (1) confidentiality between the identified parties is important to the
relationship; (2) parties within the relationship assume that communications
will remain confidential; (3) the relationship itself is worth maintaining because
it serves important policy objectives; and (4) benefits of the proposed privilege
outweigh any cost to the accurate resolution of cases.2 68 Theories of adolescent
development suggest that children naturally look to parents for advice and gen-
erally believe that parents can be trusted with sensitive information.2 69 Preser-
vation of the parent-child relationship also clearly promotes important social
policy. Parent-child privileges, such as those in Connecticut, Idaho, and Min-
nesota, are designed to preserve the sanctity of parent-child relationships,
encourage children to seek help from their parents when in trouble, and allow
parents to serve as a conduit for children seeking to exercise important constitu-
tional rights or consult with professionals such as attorneys and therapists who
are protected by long-standing privileges. 7 ° In cases where there is a risk that
parents will usurp control if invited into the attorney-child meeting, a broader
parent-child privilege would allow the child to consult privately with the law-
yer and then seek additional help at home from the parent. Parent-child privi-
leges also protect the rights of parents to raise children without undue
government interference and preserve diversity and individuality in society.271
Parent-child privileges are not without problems. In deciding whether to
adopt the privilege, policymakers will need to weigh the likely benefits against
any negative impact the proposed privilege may have on the truth-seeking func-
tion of the courts and the fair administration of justice-especially when seri-
ous juvenile crime is at issue. Professor Catherine Ross provides a useful
framework, by drawing an analogy to the spousal privilege, for analyzing how
the parent-child privilege might be drafted. 72 There are three basic alterna-
tives. Drafted in the broadest form, the privilege would prohibit the parent
from testifying against the child in any criminal or civil proceeding, absent the
child's consent. Under this framework, the parent could not testify either about
confidential communications of the child or about information the parent per-
sonally observed or learned from a source other than the child.27 3 A second,
more narrow privilege would only protect confidential communications made
by the child to the parent, but would allow litigants to compel the parents'
testimony about conduct observed by the parent-such as drug use, possession
268 Ross, supra note 56, at 91-92 (discussing Wigmore's four-part standard for the estab-
lishment of new privileges).
269 Ross, supra note 56, at 92.
270 See id. at 86-87, 90 (reviewing arguments and proposing new arguments in favor of
parent-child privilege); see also supra note 169.
271 See generally Ross, supra 56, at 92.
272 Id. at 90, 116.
273 Id. at 116 (parent could not testify about gang colors, drug use or weapons); cf, e.g.,
WASH REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (neither husband nor wife can testify against the other with-
out consent).
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of weapons, and apparent gang involvement.2 7 4 A third, even more narrow
framework would give rights in the privilege to the parent and allow the parent
to exercise his or her judgment in electing or refusing to testify against the
child.275 None of these frameworks would protect unrelated communications
from the parent to the child as such a privilege would not serve the same policy
objectives as the protection of communication from the child to the parent.27 6
Because successful family-focused juvenile justice models are particularly
concerned with fostering good communication between parents and their chil-
dren, all states should at least adopt the narrow privilege that protects confiden-
tial communications by the child to the parent. Policymakers, however, will
likely reject an absolute privilege that precludes parents from seeking help
when children are threatening or abusive to other family members or when the
parents need the court's assistance in obtaining treatment and services for the
child.27 7 To accommodate these concerns, exceptions to the privilege might be
appropriate in criminal or delinquency cases in which the parent is the victim of
the child's conduct or in civil commitment cases in which the child presents an
imminent threat to himself or others.27 8 In cases where the child makes no
confidential communication to the parent but the parent plainly observes illegal
conduct by the child, legislatures should follow the lead of Connecticut and
allow the parent to elect or refuse to testify against the child.2 79 In deciding
whether to testify, the parent might reasonably consider whether the testimony
would have a detrimental impact on plans to rehabilitate the child, whether the
parent's testimony would irreparably damage the parent's relationship with the
child, whether the child poses a serious risk of threat to family, friends, neigh-
bors, or the community at large, and whether the parent may access services for
the child without a juvenile court adjudication.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although there has been a general consensus among scholars that the
child's constitutional right to counsel in a delinquency case belongs to the child
and not the parent, there has been little discussion about exactly what role the
parents can or should play in the attorney-child relationship. Rules of ethics,
principles of constitutional law, and theories of procedural justice all dictate
limits on the role of parents in the attorney-child dyad. Stated simply, absent
clear evidence that the child is incompetent to engage in the reasoning process,
lawyers may not look to parents to set the objectives of the child's juvenile
case. Notwithstanding these limits, parents can and do remain integrally
involved in the decision-making process with their children. Strategic and
logistical considerations often require lawyers and children to collaborate with
parents; and theories of adolescent development suggest that children who
274 Ross, supra note 56, at 90, 116.
275 Id. at 116.
276 Id. at 96 (recognizing that parents rarely look to children for advice).
277 Id. at 116.
278 Id. at 117; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-138a (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203(7)
(Michie 2005); MINN. STAT. § 595.020) (2005).
279 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-138a.
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engage in healthy, open communication within the home have better prospects
for rehabilitation. The child's lawyer who is left to navigate the difficult rela-
tionship with parents and children may draw upon the lawyering strategies pro-
posed in this article. The effective advocate will ultimately improve the quality
of the child's legal decisions by empowering children to direct the course of
their own legal representation, managing the expectations of parents, educating
parents to be better advisors for the child, teaching the child to collaborate with
parents, and giving the child a voice in the juvenile justice system. Unfortu-
nately, absent a parent-child privilege and clear extension of the attorney-client
privilege to protect confidential communications among lawyers, children, and
their parents, collaboration in the attorney-child-parent triad will always be
strained. As a result, advocates should lobby policymakers to provide clarity in
these areas.
